0120113609
09-26-2013
Patricia Fichtner, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.
Patricia Fichtner,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Eastern Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120113609
Hearing No. 532-2009-00115X
Agency No. 1C-0431-0010-09
DECISION
JURISDICTION
On June 29, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's June 23, 2011 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission deems this appeal as timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Agency's Processing and Distribution Center in Columbus, Ohio.
On November 6, 2008, Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor and filed a formal EEO complaint on June 13, 2011, alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of disability (Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, "MRSA")1 when, on September 27, 2008, Complainant was issued a Notice of Removal following the Agency's failure to provide her with a reasonable accommodation.
At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided a copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing finding no discrimination following the Agency's motion for summary judgment and Complainant's response.
The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to establish coverage under the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the AJ determined that Complainant's condition, MRSA, is a temporary condition. As such, the AJ agreed with the Agency's argument that Complainant could not be considered disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, finding that Complainant could not establish a prima facie case, the AJ concluded that Complainant could not establish that the Agency's actions constituted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Agency's final action summarily implemented the AJ's decision. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Standard of Review
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999). (providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and the Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
Summary Judgment
We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.
The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper." Pedersen v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February 24, 1995).
After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case. In finding no discrimination, the AJ relied on the Agency's assertion that Complainant's medical condition did not constitute a disability. Complainant, in her response to the Agency's motion for summary judgment, challenged the assertion that her condition was temporary. Complainant indicated that it persisted for 15 months and she still was experiencing residual effects from the ailment. We note that the AJ failed to consider such facts when rendering his decision. The AJ only accepted the Agency's assertion that Complainant's condition was temporary.2 Furthermore, Complainant claimed that the Agency denied her request for a reasonable accommodation. As a result of the Agency's denial, she alleged she was subsequently issued the Notice of Removal in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
We find that Complainant has alleged that she is an individual with a disability. As such, whether she is substantially limited in a major life activity is an issue of material fact which is not resolved by this record. Further, we find that the AJ's conclusion that Complainant was not substantially limited in a major life activity was perfunctory, and that he merely relied on the representations of the Agency, as set forth in their Motion. We also find that the AJ's decision failed to address Complainant's assertion that the Agency denied her request for a reasonable accommodation and, as a result, she was issued the Notice of Removal on September 27, 2008. Accordingly, because these are material facts in dispute, we find that summary judgment was not appropriate.
We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative process, designed to ensure that the parties have "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and, in appropriate instances, to examine and cross-examine witnesses." See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 7-1 (November 9, 1999); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e). "Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims." Bang v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578 (April 25, 1995). In summary, there are simply too many unresolved issues which require an assessment by the AJ. Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the Agency should not have been granted.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant's arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the Agency in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.
ORDER
The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit in the Cleveland District Office within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing and issue a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the Agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 26, 2013
__________________
Date
1 This case arose before January 1, 2009, the effective date of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, which made a number of significant changes to the definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Because this matter occurred in 2008, the Commission will use the analytical framework as it existed before the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, to determine whether Complainant is an individual with a disability.
2 We note that the Commission has stated that a short-term condition without residual effects is not a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Appendix to 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 - Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Section 1630.2(j); Marshall v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No 05950004 (June 2, 1995). However, here, Complainant has asserted that she has had residual effects from MRSA.
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0120113609
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120113609