Melvin C. Porter, Complainant,v.Henrietta H. Fore, Acting Administrator, Agency for International Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 29, 2008
0120070219 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 29, 2008)

0120070219

08-29-2008

Melvin C. Porter, Complainant, v. Henrietta H. Fore, Acting Administrator, Agency for International Development, Agency.


Melvin C. Porter,

Complainant,

v.

Henrietta H. Fore,

Acting Administrator,

Agency for International Development,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070219

Agency No. EOP-04-02

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's September 14, 2006 final

decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

an Administrative Officer, GS-14, at the agency's facility in Washington,

D.C. On December 19, 2003, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging

that he was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American),

sex (male), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. Beginning July 1, 2003, complainant's supervisor solicited

information from his colleagues to use against him, and sent complainant

electronic mail messages that included statements about complainant's

failure to perform his duties and responsibilities. These actions were

designed to support an unfavorable evaluation of complainant;

2. On July 8, 2003, complainant's supervisor failed to follow the

Agency Employee Evaluation Guidance for mid-year reviews when she denied

complainant sufficient time to prepare for his mid-year review, denied

him the opportunity to provide 360 degree sources prior to the review, and

denied him the opportunity to have a third party present at the review.

3. On July 9, 2003, complainant's supervisor assessed his performance

as "borderline unacceptable;" and

4. On October 21, 2003, complainant's supervisor denied him the

opportunity to incorporate changes to his performance measures for the

2003 rating cycle. The unchanged performance measures undermined his

ability to demonstrate performance at the effective and above levels.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b) concluding that complainant failed to prove that

he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

In its decision, the agency dismissed claims (1) through (3) pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(3) on the grounds that complainant had filed

a civil action encompassing the same claims.

The agency found that with respect to claim (4), complainant did not

establish a prima facie case of either sex or race discrimination because

complainant had not identified any similarly situated employees, not

in complainant's protected classes, whose performance measures had been

changed upon their request shortly before the end of the rating period.

The agency found that complainant did establish a prima facie case of

reprisal discrimination. The agency found that complainant's supervisor

was aware of complainant's previous EEO activity and that activity shortly

preceded the incident described in claim (4). However, the agency found

that complainant's supervisor considered that performance measures must be

in place 120 days before the end of the rating cycle to be in compliance

with the agency's guidelines. The agency found that complainant had

not shown the agency's articulated reasons for its actions to be false

or unworthy of belief. Rather, the agency observed that complainant

admitted he did not know of any other employees who had been permitted

to change performance measures so close to the end of the rating period.

The agency found that complainant did not successfully show that the

agency's reasons for its actions were pretext. Accordingly, the agency

found that no discrimination occurred as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to

an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal

claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of

reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a

nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.

Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340

(September 25, 2000).

In the instant case, we find the agency properly dismissed claims (1),

(2) and (3) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(3). We observe that

Civil Action No. 04-1440 (RBW), filed in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia alleges discrimination in violation

of Title VII and encompasses the "borderline acceptable" performance

evaluation complainant received in July 2003.

With respect to claim (4), we concur with the agency that none of

the evidence presented shows that the agency's reasons for denying

complainant's request to change his performance measures were pretext.

We find that complainant did not identify any other employees who, in

similar circumstances were treated better than he was. Nor do we find

evidence that agency policies permit a supervisor to modify performance

standards as complainant requested in October 2003 for the 2003 rating

period. We find that complainant did not show that more likely than

not reprisal motivated the agency's decision as alleged.

Based on a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's final

decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 29, 2008

__________________

Date

2

0120070219

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036