01A24396_r
09-03-2003
Louis A. Garcy, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Louis A. Garcy v. United States Postal Service
01A24396
September 3, 2003
.
Louis A. Garcy,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A24396
Agency Nos. 3-S-1065-91, 1-H-1189-93
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final
decision by the agency dated June 20, 2002, finding that it was in
compliance with the terms of the November 29, 1993 settlement agreement
into which the parties entered.<1>
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
The Complainant will be accom[m]odated with 4 hours of work with a
starting time of 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. This settlement will become
effective on Monday (12/6/93).
Complainant initiated contact with the EEO Office on November 27, 2000,
alleging that the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement.
Specifically, complainant alleged that on November 21, 2000, the agency
forced him to accept a rehabilitation job offer at a new duty station
with different work hours than was agreed to in the settlement agreement.
In its June 20, 2002 decision, the agency concluded that the settlement
agreement was not breached. The agency noted that complainant's job at
the Tamarac Station was abolished, and that all of the limited duty jobs
were abolished based on operational needs. Further, the agency stated
that complainant had been in a non-duty status for approximately one
year and upon his return to work he was offered one of the available
positions within his limitations. The agency noted that on November
20, 2000 , complainant was offered a position as a modified carrier at
the North Ridge Annex with a schedule of 12:00 noon through 4:00 p.m.
The agency stated that the settlement agreement does not provide specific
terms regarding the length of the settlement. The agency argued that
it did not breach the settlement agreement.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the present case, we find that complainant has not shown that the
agency breached the November 29, 1993 settlement agreement. The
agreement provided that complainant would be accommodated with 4 hours
of work with a starting time of 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. The settlement
agreement become effective on December 6, 1993. Complainant does not
allege that the agency failed to accommodate him effective December
6, 1993. Rather, he claims that the agency breached the agreement on
November 21, 2000, when it offered a rehabilitation job offer at a new
duty station with different work hours. When a settlement agreement does
not provide a specific time period within which an agency will execute the
terms, the Commission has held that the agency is required to act within
a reasonable amount of time. See Gomez v. Department of the Treasury,
EEOC Request No. 05930921 (February 10, 1994); Parker v. Department
of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05910576 (August 29, 1991). We note that
the agreement in the present case did not specify that complainant would
retain a starting time of 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. indefinitely. Therefore,
we do not find that the agency breached the agreement when it changed
complainant's work hours on November 21, 2000, seven years after the
agreement was signed.
Accordingly, the agency's final decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 3, 2003
__________________
Date
1On his appeal form complainant states
that he is alleging a breach of a settlement agreement involving
Agency No. 4H-330-0341-02. The record reveals, however, that Agency
No. 4H-330-0341-02 involves complainant's allegation of discrimination
surrounding the change of his work hours and duty station on November 21,
2000, and not his breach of settlement allegation. Further, the record
reveals that Agency No. 4H-330-0341-02 was forwarded for a hearing to
the EEOC's Miami District Office on June 20, 2003. We find the correct
numbers in the present case are Agency Nos. 3-S-1065-91, 1-H-1189-93.