Louie Guzman, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 14, 2003
01A30736 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 14, 2003)

01A30736

08-14-2003

Louie Guzman, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Louie Guzman v. United States Postal Service

01A30736

08-14-03

.

Louie Guzman,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A30736

Agency No. 4F-926-0140-98

Hearing No. 340-99-3105X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Letter Carrier at the agency's

Glendora, California facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on June 25,

1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the bases

of national origin (Hispanic), sex (male) and reprisal for prior EEO

activity when he was issued a Notice of Removal, effective February 24,

1998, charging him with violation of his Last Chance Agreement / Absent

Without Official Leave (AWOL).

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination. The AJ concluded that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination

and reprisal. The AJ did not mention complainant's allegation of sex

based discrimination because, during his deposition, the complainant

seemed to withdraw this claim.<1> Specifically, the AJ found that

complainant failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees

not in complainant's protected classes were treated differently under

similar circumstances. The AJ also concluded that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of reprisal due to the undisputed fact

that complainant had never been previously engaged in prior EEO activity.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant restates his argument that the agency's policy

for incarceration not being an acceptable excuse for absence was applied

differently among employees. In response, the agency restates the

position it took in its FAD, and requests that we affirm its final order.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after

the summary judgement procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States Supreme Court has held that

summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that given the

substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there

exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the

court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues of fact for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage, and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has

established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

Complainant missed work for three days because he was incarcerated.

He stated that he did not have permission for leave from work. The

agency charged him as AWOL. The agency stated that because complainant

was AWOL, which violated the terms of his Last Chance Agreement, the

letter of removal was appropriate. Complainant showed that a similarly

situated employee, not of complainant's protected class (SE) was absent

from work for incarceration and charged with Leave Without Pay (LWOP).

SE was not terminated. However, complainant acknowledged that SE had

permission for that leave and was not under a Last Chance Agreement.

Complainant also acknowledged that the agency requires its employees to

obtain permission for any leave taken. For these reasons, SE is not

a similarly situated employee and does not establish pretext for the

agency's actions. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable

to complainant, we note that complainant failed to present any other

evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory

animus toward complainant's protected class. We also agree with the

AJ's finding that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of reprisal due to the undisputed fact that complainant had never been

previously engaged in prior EEO activity.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant of

summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material fact

exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

We therefore AFFIRM the agency's final order of no discrimination on

the bases of national origin or reprisal.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___08-14-03_______________

Date

1Complainant never formally stated that he withdrew sex as a basis

for this action. During his deposition, when asked if he believed

if his supervisors disliked him because of his sex, he responded,

�not that I'm aware of.� When asked if he was alleging that he was

discriminated against based on his sex, he responded, �I am not � I

don't know.� The questioning attorney also asked, �So it is not the

sex so much, it is � the nationality is the basis of your complaint?�

Complainant responded �yes.� Assuming arguendo that complainant did

not intend to withdraw sex as a basis, complainant did not establish a

prima facie case of sex discrimination because he provided no evidence

of similarly situated female employees.