Patent Appeal No. 8007. January 16, 1969. Raywood H. Blanchard, Kalamazoo, Mich., (Eugene O. Retter, George T. Johannesen, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND and BALDWIN, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of the sole remaining claim in
Patent Appeal No. 7265. July 22, 1965. Louis C. Smith, Jr., Francis M. Fazio, New York City, Paul A. Rose, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J.E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. Appellant Dunn with one Proops obtained a series of five patents for improvements in a classic synthesis of acrylic acid esters obtained by reaction of acetylene
Patent Appeal No. 5107. March 6, 1946. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 278,027. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Joseph W. Ayers for a patent on a process of producing iron oxide. From a decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the primary examiner's final rejection of one of the claims, applicant appeals. Affirmed. Hammond Littell, of New York City (Albert C. Johnston, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. W.W. Cochran, of Washington
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)