Kevin Jester

9 Cited authorities

Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.
786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 31 times 5 Legal Analyses
Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"
Beckwith v. Commr. of Patents
252 U.S. 538 (1920) Cited 177 times 1 Legal Analyses
Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 28 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.
695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 25 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP
373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) Cited 30 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,904 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,605 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Kevin Jester

9 Cited authorities

Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"

Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"