398 U.S. 144 (1970) Cited 25,462 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that a private person who conspires with government actors to deprive a plaintiff of her constitutional rights acts "under color of law" for purposes of § 1983
Holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient antitrust injury because it could not connect its losses to behavior violating the Robinson–Patman Act
Holding that where a party places a "collective mark on its products, it is primarily responsible for any confusion that result from the mark's assertion of affiliation, and that confusion cannot be used to support a charge of infringement"
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Finding gray goods sales not to infringe trademark holder's rights under Lanham Act § 32 (prohibiting use of mark in such a way as to cause confusion) or Lanham Act § 43 (prohibiting false designation of origin)
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"