John Azzarelli

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 25, 2019

14279606 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/279,606 05/16/2014 John Azzarelli AZZ-001 7764
52554 7590 07/25/2019
Southeast IP Group, LLC.
P.O. Box 14156
GREENVILLE, SC 29610
EXAMINER
ADAMS, NATHANIEL L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3654
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/25/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOHN AZZARELLI
____________

Appeal 2018-003713
Application 14/279,6061
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 5, and 6.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is John Azzarelli.
(Appeal Br. 1.)
2 The rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was withdrawn.
(Answer 3.)
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Application 14/279,606

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention “relates to a mobile winching system.”
(Spec. 1, l. 5.)
Claim 1 is the sole independent claim still on appeal. It recites
(emphasis added):
1. A mobile winch system comprising:
a longitudinal frame having a first end opposite a second
end, said first end including a handle and at least two
bidirectional, free-spinning wheels attached adjacent said second
end thereof;
a strap removably attached to said longitudinal frame at
the end opposite said handle for anchoring said winch system in
a generally fixed position so that said longitudinal frame is
generally disposed and oriented in a horizontal position, parallel
to a ground surface where said longitudinal frame rests;
a winch mounted to said longitudinal frame, said winch
comprising a motor, a winch drum, and a winch cable attached
to and wound about said winch drum, said winch cable also
having a free end; and
a power source mounted to said frame for driving said
motor.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Smith (US 6,231,030 B1, iss. May 15, 2001).
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Smith.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1–3 and 6
“[A]n invention is anticipated if the same device, including all the
claim limitations, is shown in a single prior art reference. Every element of
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the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim.”
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The handle
Smith discloses “[a] two wheeled trailed vehicle intended to be towed
by a conventional frontal hitch attachment to the rear of an all terrain
vehicle.” (Smith, Abstract.) Specifically, Smith discloses a “nominally
horizontal frame 10 [that] is basically triangular with a forward extension 39
upon which the preferred hitch 19, a conventional ball coupling 29 is
mounted.” (Id. at col. 5, ll. 53–56.)
The Examiner finds that Smith’s disclosure of forward extension 39 is
a disclosure of a handle. Appellant disagrees and argues that “nowhere in
Smith is the forward projection 39 even remotely described as a handle. . . .
[I]t seems clear that neither a handle nor manual transportation of the unit is
even implied as it is not necessary.” (Appeal Br. 5.) In particular, Appellant
argues that the
Examiner is obviously making the broadest possible
interpretation because no ordinary people skilled in the art would
construe the extension upon which a hitch is mounted to be a
handle, under its plain meaning. The term’s plain meaning and
Applicant’s specification clearly indicate that Applicant’s
claimed handle is used to manually transport Applicant’s winch
system. However, as stated earlier, forward extension 39 is not
explicitly nor implicitly disclosed as being utilized as a handle,
to manually transport the invention of Smith nor as being
necessary or desired for such function.

(Id. at 6.)
The Examiner answers that
Smith 39 is the neck portion connected to a “conventional ball
coupler” (29). When hitching a trailer to a standard ball mount,
such as the one taught in Smith, if the ball (which is connected
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to the vehicle) is not perfectly under the hitch, the operator either
has to move the entire vehicle, or force the hitch into place above
the ball by pushing/pulling on the neck portion to get the hitch
aligned with the ball. Due to its proximity to the coupler (29),
Smith’s element 39 could reasonably be construed as a “handle”
in that this portion of a trailer is regularly used to move the
coupler into position.

(Answer 4.) Appellant does not dispute that the forward extension 39 of
Smith may be used in this manner.
We give claims their “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Under this standard, “claim language should be read in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.”
In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The Specification discloses “a handle-like structure for transporting
the system.” (Spec. 3, ll. 9–10.) The Specification also discloses that “[a]
single person can easily move the mobile winch system 1 to any physical
location required by simply using the handle 6 and wheel 7 system in a
common and well-known manner.” (Id. at 6, ll. 9–11.) The Specification
further discloses that “[a]ll features disclosed in this specification may be
replace by alternative features serving the same, equivalent or similar
purpose, unless expressly stated otherwise.” (Id. at 9, ll. 16–17.) In view of
these disclosures, and that neither Appellant nor the Examiner point to any
special definition of the term “handle” in the Specification, we agree with
Appellant that a plain meaning should be applied to the term. (See Appeal
Br. 6.)
Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, we determine that the term
“handle” includes “[a] part of a thing by which it is to be held in order to
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use, move, or carry it; (hence) any part or object used in this way.”
(https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/83878?rskey=hlGYmZ&result=1#eid,
last visited July 16, 2019.)
Applying this definition, the forward extension 39 of Smith is a part
of the device that may be held in order to move the device, e.g., to manually
position the device to place the coupler in proper position. (See Answer 4.)
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Smith discloses a handle.
The strap
Smith discloses a cinch “comprised of a length of chain 31 attachable
to two appropriate cinch support points 30. Another type of flexible but
inextensible length such as a cable or a belt is considered feasible for use as
a cinch 13.” (Smith, col. 6, ll. 42–45.)
The Examiner finds that Smith’s disclosure of the cinch belt is a
disclosure of a strap. Additionally, the Examiner finds that Smith discloses
that the belt is “removably attached to said longitudinal frame (10) at the end
(60) opposite said handle (39)” and is “capable of anchoring” the device.
(Non-Final Action 3; see also Answer 5.)
Appellant disagrees and argues that “the cinch of Smith is not
disclosed 1) as being on an opposite end of the frame from a handle nor 2) as
being used to anchor the skidder in a fixed manner during winching
operations, both of which Applicant claims.” (Appeal Br. 6.)
With regard to Appellant’s first argument, Appellant does not
persuasively argue why the disclosure in, e.g., Figure 1 of Smith showing
forward extension 39 at one end of the device and chain/belt cinch 31 at the
other end of the device, is not a disclosure of the cinch being on the opposite
end of the frame from the handle, as found by the Examiner.
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With regard to Appellant’s second argument, we note that claim 1 is a
device claim reciting “a strap removably attached to said longitudinal frame
at the end opposite said handle.” The additional language in the limitation
that the strap is “for anchoring said winch,” describes the intended use, and
informs us that the strap must be capable of being so used. However, “the
absence of a disclosure relating to function does not defeat . . . [a] finding of
anticipation. It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an
old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable.” In re
Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, the Examiner finds
that the chain/belt cinch 31 “of Smith is capable of anchoring the winch
system as claimed.” (Answer 5.) Appellant does not persuasively argue
why the Examiner’s finding is in error, i.e., why the chain/belt cinch 31 of
Smith is not capable of anchoring the device.
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Smith.
Appellant argues that dependent claims 2, 3, and 6 “are not
anticipated by Smith for the reasons set forth in favor of claim 1.” (Appeal
Br. 7.) For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2, 3, and 6 as anticipated by Smith.

Claim 5
Appellant presents a separate topic heading in arguing the
patentability of claim 5. However, Appellant simply presents the same
arguments discussed above with regard to claim 1. For the reasons
discussed above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 5 as obvious over Smith.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3 and 6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED