IV Science, LLC d/b/a Green & Co.

8 Cited authorities

In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 40 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.
695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 24 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Smith
828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 57 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding applicant's incontestable registration of a service mark for "cash management account" did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
In re Stereotaxis, Inc.
429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 7 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 19 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,603 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

IV Science, LLC d/b/a Green & Co.

8 Cited authorities

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

Holding applicant's incontestable registration of a service mark for "cash management account" did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services

Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"