In the Matter of W

4 Citing cases

  1. Reyes v. Lynch

    835 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that the BIA had reasonably concluded that prostitution was a crime involving moral turpitude and that "there [was] no reason to consider the solicitation of prostitution to be significantly less base, vile, and depraved than the act of prostitution itself" (cleaned up)

    Rohit , 670 F.3d at 1089. Specifically, the BIA has found that the act of prostitution is a CIMT, In the Matter of W–––– , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951), and the BIA has also found that “keeping a house of ill-fame” and “renting rooms with knowledge that the rooms were to be used for the purpose of ... prostitution” are CIMTs, Matter of Lambert , 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (BIA 1965). Because these BIA decisions “are entitled to Chevron deference and are certainly permissible interpretations of the statute,” the Ninth Circuit held that solicitation of prostitution was also a CIMT because “[t]here is no meaningful distinction that would lead us to conclude that engaging in an act of prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude but that soliciting or agreeing to engage in an act of prostitution is not.” Rohit , 670 F.3d at 1089–90.

  2. Rohit v. Holder 

    670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that solicitation of prostitution under California Penal Code §647(b) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude

    The Attorney General does not assert that the Board has ever found, in a published opinion, that solicitation of prostitution is a crime involving moral turpitude. Rather, he argues that this result flows naturally from precedential cases holding that prostitution involves moral turpitude, see W., 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 401–02 (Bd. Immigration Appeals 1951), and that facilitating prostitution by renting a room with the knowledge that it will be used for prostitution involves moral turpitude, see Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (Bd. Immigration Appeals 1965). While these cases may support the Board's decision on the merits, they do not make its decision precedential. Because the Board has not decided in a precedential case whether Rohit's conduct involves moral turpitude, we apply Skidmore deference to its non-precedential decision that it does. Marmolejo–Campos, 558 F.3d at 909–11.

  3. Ortega-Cordova v. Garland

    107 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2024)

    Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied relief because Ortega-Cordova had failed to demonstrate, as necessary to establish his eligibility for such relief, see id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), that he had not been convicted of a crime listed in § 1227(a)(2) — namely, as applicable here, "a crime involving moral turpitude . . . for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed," id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Relying on the position "long held" by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") that prostitution and prostitution-related offenses were "morally turpitudinous," the IJ concluded that the Virginia solicitation law similarly criminalized conduct "that inherently involves moral turpitude," citing Matter of W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401 (BIA 1951); Matter of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1965); Matter of P-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 20 (BIA 1947). Accordingly, the IJ denied Ortega-Cordova's application for relief and ordered him removed to El Salvador.

  4. Florentino-Francisco v. Lynch

    611 F. App'x 936 (10th Cir. 2015)   Cited 5 times

    The BIA has long viewed prostitution-related crimes as morally turpitudinous. See, e.g., Matter of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (BIA 1965) (holding that "renting rooms with knowledge that the rooms were to be used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution were for crimes involving moral turpitude"); Matter of A-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 546, 549 (BIA 1953) ("[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude."); Matter of W-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) ("It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude."); Matter of S-L-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1949) (holding that "procur[ing] a female inmate for a house of prostitution" involves moral turpitude because (1) it "is a crime in which assistance and aid is given to the carrying on of the business of prostitution" and (2) "[i]t is so far contrary to moral law, as interpreted by the general moral sense of the community, that the offender is brought to public disgrace, is no longer generally respected, and is deprived of social recognition by the community"); Matter of P-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 20, 22 (BIA 1947) (concluding that the crime of "keeping a house of ill-fame . . . palpably involves moral turpitude"). Deferring to the BIA's view of prostitution-related crimes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that soliciting prostitution also involves moral turpitude: