IN THE MATTER OF SEDA

8 Citing cases

  1. Delgado-Chavez v. I.N.S.

    765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    In Delgado-Chavez v. INS, 765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), we expressly rejected Giambanco, id. at 869-70, and held that a prior conviction that section 241(b) precluded from serving as a basis for deportation nonetheless "may be considered as an adverse factor in deciding whether the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," id. at 869 (citing In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980)).

    Rather, a conviction may be considered as an adverse factor in deciding whether the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 554 (1980). Delgado-Chavez, however, argues that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), the recommendation against deportation by the state court judge prevents consideration of his conviction in connection with his application for voluntary departure.

  2. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    22 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    However, the Board's reasoning as well as its broad rejection of Giambanco, a case which appeared to apply to all forms of discretionary relief, suggested that the general principle that Congress did not intend for state expunging regimes to bar consideration of either past conduct or the consequences that the state attached to such conduct in a discretionary determination was applicable elsewhere. This reading of Gonzalez appears confirmed by In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), in which the Board held that, although a conviction expunged under a state expunging statute could not be considered "an admission of commission of the crime" for the purposes of barring eligibility for voluntary departure, the fact of the guilty plea properly could be considered as an "adverse factor . . . in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. at 554. A broad view of Gonzalez also was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988).

  3. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that an IJ is entitled to special deference when "[t]he IJ's factual premise . . . is based solely on his purported eye-witness observation of Petitioner's reactions, rests on inferences drawn exclusively from the petitioner's demeanor"

    However, the Board's reasoning as well as its broad rejection of Giambanco, a case which appeared to apply to all forms of discretionary relief, suggested that the general principle that Congress did not intend for state expunging regimes to bar consideration of either past conduct or the consequences that the state attached to such conduct in discretionary determination was applicable elsewhere. This reading of Gonzalez appears confirmed by In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), in which the Board held that, although a conviction expunged under a state expunging statute could not be considered "an admission of commission of the crime" for the purposes of barring eligibility for voluntary departure, the fact of the guilty plea properly could be considered as an "adverse factor . . . in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," id. at 554. A broad view of Gonzalez also was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988).

  4. Martinez-Montoya v. I.N.S.

    904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that deferred adjudication under Texas law did not qualify as "conviction" for federal immigration purposes under the pre-IIRIRA definition

    Until the BIA decision in Ozkok, the INS consistently applied this same test to a myriad of immigration matters for over thirty years. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, Int. Dec. 2995 (BIA 1985); Matter of Zangwill, 18 I N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Robinson, 16 I N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, 16 I N Dec. 48 (BIA 1976); Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963). In Ozkok, however, the BIA rejected this well-established test as too narrow and undesirably subject to the vagaries of state law.

  5. Carr v. I.N.S.

    86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude

    As a result of this statute, the Attorney General will not deport an alien if the alien's federal conviction has been expunged under section 3607. See, e.g., Matter of Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 553 (BIA 1980). In addition, if a state enacts a statutory counterpart to section 3607, the Service will recognize the state expungement of state drug offenses.

  6. Hassan v. I.N.S.

    66 F.3d 266 (10th Cir. 1995)

    We extend this rule to use of the guilty plea underlying the conviction, which is itself a significant adverse factor. See In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 550 (BIA 1980). Consideration of petitioner's guilty pleas to burglary and theft was not erroneous.

  7. Castano v. I.N.S.

    956 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1992)   Cited 8 times
    Upholding BIA's determination of removability based on facts underlying conviction for distributing cocaine, even though conviction was expunged under federal youthful-offender rehabilitation statute

    Petitioner carried the burden of establishing both his statutory eligibility and moral worthiness for voluntary departure. See Matter of Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980). While the expunged conviction could not be the basis for disallowance, the extrinsic evidence underlying the conviction rendered petitioner statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure as a person lacking in good moral character.

  8. Oviawe v. I.N.S.

    853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988)   Cited 20 times

    Although the fact of his conviction should not preclude him from establishing statutory eligibility for the relief, we are of the opinion that the respondent is neither a person of good moral character nor a person who merits a favorable exercise of discretion. Gonzalez, 16 I N Dec. at 136-37; see In re Seda, 17 I N Dec. 550, 554 (1980) (conviction may be considered as an adverse factor under discretionary review). Accordingly, we hold that the BIA properly considered Mr. Oviawe's prior criminal convictions of moral turpitude as an adverse factor in exercising its discretion to deny Mr. Oviawe relief.