IN THE MATTER OF SEDA

13 Citing cases

  1. Delgado-Chavez v. I.N.S.

    765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    In Delgado-Chavez v. INS, 765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), we expressly rejected Giambanco, id. at 869-70, and held that a prior conviction that section 241(b) precluded from serving as a basis for deportation nonetheless "may be considered as an adverse factor in deciding whether the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," id. at 869 (citing In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980)).

    Rather, a conviction may be considered as an adverse factor in deciding whether the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 554 (1980). Delgado-Chavez, however, argues that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), the recommendation against deportation by the state court judge prevents consideration of his conviction in connection with his application for voluntary departure.

  2. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    22 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    However, the Board's reasoning as well as its broad rejection of Giambanco, a case which appeared to apply to all forms of discretionary relief, suggested that the general principle that Congress did not intend for state expunging regimes to bar consideration of either past conduct or the consequences that the state attached to such conduct in a discretionary determination was applicable elsewhere. This reading of Gonzalez appears confirmed by In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), in which the Board held that, although a conviction expunged under a state expunging statute could not be considered "an admission of commission of the crime" for the purposes of barring eligibility for voluntary departure, the fact of the guilty plea properly could be considered as an "adverse factor . . . in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. at 554. A broad view of Gonzalez also was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988).

  3. Hernandez v. Garland

    No. 22-9581 (10th Cir. Mar. 14, 2024)

    Manriquez-Hernandez's alternative argument stems from the fact that the IJ and the Board relied on different tests in denying discretionary cancellation. The IJ relied on In re Seda, 17 I. &N. Dec. 550, 554 (B.I.A. 1980), which does not include hardship as a factor to be considered in a discretionary denial of voluntary departure. The Board, on the other hand, relied on In re C-V-T-, 22 I. &N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1998), where the Board held that "evidence of hardship to the respondent and his family if [removal] occurs" is among the "favorable considerations" that may be considered in deciding a cancellation application.

  4. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that an IJ is entitled to special deference when "[t]he IJ's factual premise . . . is based solely on his purported eye-witness observation of Petitioner's reactions, rests on inferences drawn exclusively from the petitioner's demeanor"

    However, the Board's reasoning as well as its broad rejection of Giambanco, a case which appeared to apply to all forms of discretionary relief, suggested that the general principle that Congress did not intend for state expunging regimes to bar consideration of either past conduct or the consequences that the state attached to such conduct in discretionary determination was applicable elsewhere. This reading of Gonzalez appears confirmed by In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), in which the Board held that, although a conviction expunged under a state expunging statute could not be considered "an admission of commission of the crime" for the purposes of barring eligibility for voluntary departure, the fact of the guilty plea properly could be considered as an "adverse factor . . . in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted," id. at 554. A broad view of Gonzalez also was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir. 1988).

  5. Martinez-Montoya v. I.N.S.

    904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that deferred adjudication under Texas law did not qualify as "conviction" for federal immigration purposes under the pre-IIRIRA definition

    Until the BIA decision in Ozkok, the INS consistently applied this same test to a myriad of immigration matters for over thirty years. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, Int. Dec. 2995 (BIA 1985); Matter of Zangwill, 18 I N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Robinson, 16 I N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter of Varagianis, 16 I N Dec. 48 (BIA 1976); Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963). In Ozkok, however, the BIA rejected this well-established test as too narrow and undesirably subject to the vagaries of state law.

  6. Avila-Ramirez v. Holder

    764 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014)   Cited 11 times
    Rejecting IJ's reliance on arrest reports where "[t]he government introduced no evidence corroborating any of the allegations or arrest reports"

    But the cases the BIA cited in support of this proposition make sense, and none involved only uncorroborated police reports. Some, for example, involved guilty pleas or other admissions. Matter of Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980) (guilty plea); White v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 475 (1st Cir.1994) (guilty plea); Paredes–Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir.1994) (pre-trial diversion where defendant initially testified that friend told him he had drugs for sale); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1985) (acknowledgment of participation in “violent demonstration” corroborated pending arson charges arising out of demonstration). Others concerned convictions with a judicial recommendation against deportation.

  7. Mesura v. Holder

    563 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2014)

    These cases do not establish a hard and fast rule of law, but instead reflect that moral character should be determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550, 554-55 (BIA 1980); Matter of Locicero, 11 I&N Dec. 805, 805 (BIA 1966); Matter of C-, 3 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1950); Matter of K-, 3 I&N Dec. 180, 181 (BIA 1949). Because the agency did not err in its factual findings, and considered the relevant factors when weighing the equities, it adhered to precedent and reasonably concluded that Mesura did not establish good moral character.

  8. Carr v. I.N.S.

    86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude

    As a result of this statute, the Attorney General will not deport an alien if the alien's federal conviction has been expunged under section 3607. See, e.g., Matter of Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 553 (BIA 1980). In addition, if a state enacts a statutory counterpart to section 3607, the Service will recognize the state expungement of state drug offenses.

  9. Hassan v. I.N.S.

    66 F.3d 266 (10th Cir. 1995)

    We extend this rule to use of the guilty plea underlying the conviction, which is itself a significant adverse factor. See In re Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550, 550 (BIA 1980). Consideration of petitioner's guilty pleas to burglary and theft was not erroneous.

  10. Molina v. I.N.S.

    981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Examining Rhode Island's nolo contendere scheme to determine whether nolo pleas constitute "convictions" under Ozkok

    These standards clearly exempted "plea plus probation" procedures found in many states — procedures in which a court suspends entry of a judgment, never entering such a judgment if the defendant successfully completes probation. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, 19 I. N. Dec. 270 (BIA 1985) (no conviction since adjudication of guilt withheld); Matter of Seda, 17 I. N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980) (same). These standards, however, did not clearly exempt Rhode Island's procedure — a procedure in which the defendant is "adjudged guilty" at the time he presents his plea.