66 Stat. 183 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (19).See Matter of S — , 7 I. N. Dec. 715 (1958); Matter of Y — , 8 I. N. Dec. 143 (1959). The sharp divergence of opinion among the circuit judges in these cases indicates that the meaning of the words "otherwise admissible" is not obvious. An interpretation of these words requires close attention to the language of § 241(f), to the language of its predecessor, § 7 of the 1957 Act, and to the legislative history of these provisions.

The first, whether the provisions of Section 241(f) would apply to his case because he is charged with inadmissibility under the provisions of Section 211(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to aliens who at entry were not of the proper status specified in the immigrant visa, rather than under Section 212(a) (19), aliens who procured a visa by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact. The Board of Immigration Appeals, in the Matter of K____, I N Dec. 585, 589, March 9, 1962, reaffirmed the previous order in Matter of S____, 7 I N Dec. 715, holding that the section of law under which the deportation charge is laid is immaterial. The Board, in Matter of K____, stated: `There are, however, other provisions of Section 241(a) which render an alien deportable after entry on charges which flow directly from the entry by fraud or misrepresentation.

Indeed, the Board of Immigration Appeals, in construing the predecessor of Section 241(f) — Section 7 of the Act of September 11, 1957, 71 Stat. 641, 8 U.S.C. (1958 ed.) § 1251a — held that the exculpatory provision comprehends aliens not precisely within its terms, stating that "the section of the law under which the charge [for deportability] is laid is immaterial." Matter of S____, 7 I. N. Dec. 715, 717 (1958). The interesting question, therefore, is whether, even if Mrs. Scott had been (or was in effect) found deportable for having procured her visa by fraud or misrepresentation, she was "otherwise admissible at the time of entry."