Moreover, both history and practice demonstrate that the primary purpose of these statutory provisions was to enable parole of aliens for the purpose of prosecution. See Matter of K–, 9 I. & N. Dec. 143, 157 (BIA 1959) (“Congress meant for parole to be used for purposes of prosecution.”). In addition, the Attorney General has decided that “admission” is continuing, rather than an act limited to the exact time that the alien reenters the United States. See Matter of Valenzuela–Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 56.

Rather, it was fully consistent with the BIA's own practice of determining admissibility "on the basis of the law and the facts existing at the time the application is finally considered." Matter of Kazemi, 19 I. N. Dec. 49, 51 (BIA 1984); see also Matter of Alarcon, 20 I. N. Dec. 557, 562 (BIA 1992) (citing Kazemi); Matter of Correa, 19 I. N. Dec. 130, 133-35 (BIA 1984); Matter of Morgan, 13 I. N. Dec. 283, 284 (BIA 1969) ("[T]he facts as they now exist are determinative. . . ."); Matter of K-, 9 I. N. Dec. 143 (1961), aff'd sub nom.; Klapholz v. Esperdy, 201 F.Supp. 294, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam); see also Ali v. Reno, 22 F.3d 442, 448 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Kazemi). The BIA's consideration of current evidence in making its decisions in suspension of deportation cases was completely consistent with its delegated responsibility.