In the Matter of Andrade

3 Citing cases

  1. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    36 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that an IJ is entitled to special deference when "[t]he IJ's factual premise . . . is based solely on his purported eye-witness observation of Petitioner's reactions, rests on inferences drawn exclusively from the petitioner's demeanor"

    For instance, in the context of determining the meaning of the term "conviction" in the INA, the BIA has held that state statutes that are the "equivalent" of both the FFOS and the now-repealed Federal Youth Corrections Act ("FYCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1982), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (effective Oct. 12, 1984), should have the same effect as their federal counterparts. See, e.g., In re Werk, 16 I. N. Dec. 234, 235-36 (BIA 1977) (holding that state equivalents of the FFOS are entitled to the same effect as the federal provision); In re Andrade, 14 I. N. Dec. 651, 652 (BIA 1974) (holding the same with respect to the FYCA). Then-Solicitor Solicitor General Bork described the rationale behind this interpretation of the INA as follows:

  2. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. I.N.S.

    22 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    For instance, in the context of determining the meaning of the term "conviction" in the INA, the BIA has held that state statutes that are the "equivalent" of both the FFOS and the now-repealed Federal Youth Corrections Act ("FYCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1982), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (effective Oct. 12, 1984), should have the same effect as their federal counterparts. See, e.g., In re Werk, 16 I. N. Dec. 234, 235-36 (BIA 1977) (holding that state equivalents of the federal first offender statute ("FFOS"), 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1) (repealed 1984) will have the same effect as the federal provision); In re Andrade, 14 I. N. Dec. 651, 652 (BIA 1974) (holding the same with respect to the FYCA). Then-Solicitor General Bork described the rationale behind this interpretation of the INA as follows:

  3. Kolios v. Immigration Naturalization Service

    532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    He also notes that had he been convicted for a narcotics offense under federal law and dealt with under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, he would not be deported following expungement, Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); Matter of Zingis, 14 I. N.Dec. ___ (I.D. 2270) (B.I.A. 1974). Further, the Service now accords recognition to state expungements of marijuana offenders treated and expunged under state juvenile statutes, Matter of Andrade, 14 I. N.Dec. ___ (I.D. 2276) (B.I.A. 1974). In light of the currently ambivalent community and Congressional attitudes toward minor marijuana offenses, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 186, 844 (1970), the policy of construing deportation laws strictly against deportability, Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 74 S.Ct. 822, 98 L.Ed. 1009 (1954), and the legitimate goal of stimulating rehabilitation behind any expungement statute, he contends that the time has come to ameliorate the harshness of the rule initiated by the 1959 opinion of the Attorney General.