For example, in In re S-A , the Board found that an applicant was eligible for asylum when she suffered domestic abuse at the hands of her father. In re S-A- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). Relying on evidence showing that "in Morocco, domestic violence is commonplace and legal remedies are generally unavailable to women," and that " ‘few women report abuse to authorities’ because the judicial procedure is skewed against them," the Board held that "even if the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct."
Arevalo asserts the BIA erred as a matter of law in affirming the IJ's determination that she failed to establish eligibility for asylum by not demonstrating Honduran government officials were unwilling or unable to protect her from past or future harm. She contends an applicant is not required to report her abuse to establish the government is unable or unwilling to control her abuser, where available country conditions show few women make such reports "because the judicial procedure is skewed against them" citing In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1332-33 (BIA 2000). Arevalo testified: she went to a town two hours away from where she lived and the abuse occurred; told a police sergeant about the abuse; was told to make a formal complaint and/or seek a protective order; and did neither because she was afraid.
The BIA accordingly views an applicant's credibility as a threshold issue. See In Re S–A–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1331 (BIA 2000) ; In Re O–D–, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1081 (BIA 1998). An IJ must provide specific reasons to support her credibility findings so as to allow meaningful review.
See, e.g., In re S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1330, 1332-33, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000). In In re S-A-, a Moroccan woman suffered emotional and physical abuse by her father because her liberal Muslim beliefs clashed with his orthodox Muslim beliefs. 22 I. N. Dec. at 1329.
We begin by noting that reporting persecution to government authorities is not essential to demonstrating that the government is unable or unwilling to protect him from private actors. See Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d. 916, 921-22, 2010 WL 2890998 (9th Cir. 2010); In re S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000); see also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (so holding in the withholding of removal context). Rather, "the absence of a report to police . . . leaves a gap in proof about how the government would respond, which the petitioner may attempt to fill by other methods." Rahimzadeh 613 F.3d at 922, 2010 WL 2890998, *4.
We explained that, "[a]though the failure to report persecution to local government authorities generally is fatal to an asylum claim," the Board of Immigration Appeals had held that the reporting requirement "would be excused where the petitioner convincingly demonstrates that those authorities would have been unable or unwilling to protect her, and for that reason she could not rely on them." Id. at 1345; see also In re S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000). In re S-A-, the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that we cited in Lopez, also involved persecution by a private actor.
He argues that efforts to involve authorities are unnecessary when it is clear from the record that they "would have been unable or unwilling" to help. See In re S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000). The argument again misses the mark.
The BIA ruled that because Lopez did not "seek protection from law enforcement authorities in Colombia after her encounters with the [FARC] . . . she failed to demonstrate that the Colombian government is unable or unwilling to protect her." Although it is not entirely clear, the ruling appears to be that the failure to seek protection without more is enough to defeat a claim for asylum. If so, that decision is not fully consistent with In re S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000). Although the failure to report persecution to local government authorities generally is fatal to an asylum claim, Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1327, the BIA in S-A- held that it would be excused where the petitioner convincingly demonstrates that those authorities would have been unable or unwilling to protect her, and for that reason she could not rely on them. 22 I. N. Dec. at 1335.
" Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389. Kere argues that Matter of S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000), dictates a different conclusion. According to Kere, Matter of S-A- "stands for the proposition that a credible fear of persecution by a non-governmental actor on account of religious beliefs is a sufficient basis for asylum when the government is unable or unwilling to control the non-governmental actor to prevent the persecution."
Although it is not entirely clear, the ruling appears to be that the failure to seek protection without more is enough to defeat a claim for asylum. If so, that decision is not fully consistent with S-A-, 22 I. N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (BIA 2000). Although the failure to report persecution to local government authorities generally is fatal to an asylum claim, Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1327, the BIA in S-A- held that it would be excused where the petitioner convincingly demonstrates that those authorities would have been unable or unwilling to protect her, and for that reason she could not rely on them.