Hunt Tool Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 20, 1971

192 N.L.R.B. 145 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

HUNT TOOL COMPANY 145
Hunt Tool Company and Allen Simoneaux. Case
15-CA-3943
July 20, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
Upon the basis of the stipulation, the briefs, and the
entire record in this case, the Board makes the
following:
Upon a charge filed on October 16, 1970, by Allen
Simoneaux, an individual, herein called the Charging
Party, the General Counsel for the National Labor
Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region
15, issued a complaint dated January 14,197 1, against
the Hunt Tool Company, herein called the Respon-
dent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
The complaint alleges in substance that on or about
September 16, 1970, the Charging Party filed a lawsuit
which seeks damages from Respondent, inter alia,
under provisions of the Jones Act' and/or the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act,z for alleged on-the-job injury; that on or about
October 2, 1970, Respondent discharged the Charging
Party and thereafter refused, and continues to refuse,
to reinstate him because he filed suit against it; that
the Charging Party's lawsuit was protected activity,
and Respondent, by discharging and refusing to
reinstate him, has engaged in, and is engaging in,
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act.
On February 8, 1971, the Respondent filed an
answer admitting certain allegations in the complaint
and denying that the facts admitted constituted an
unfair labor practice as alleged in the complaint.
The parties to this proceeding entered into a
stipulation of facts and jointly moved that the
proceedings be transferred to the Board, stipulating
that the charge, complaint and notice of hearing,
answer and stipulation of facts shall constitute the
entire record and that no oral argument is necessary
or desired. They further stipulated that they waived a
hearing before a Trial Examiner, rulings upon motion
by a Trial Examiner, and the issuance of a Trial
Examiner's Decision. On April 7, 1971, the Board
approved the stipulation and ordered the proceedings
transferred to the Board. Thereafter, the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs.
1 46 U.S.C. 688.
2 33 U.S.C. 901.
s There is no provision in either the Jones Act or the Longshoremen's
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Texas corporation, operates a
plant in Harvey, Louisiana, where it is engaged in the
business of building and repairing ships. Annually, in
the course and conduct of its business operations at its
Harvey facility, it purchased and received goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
located outside the State of Louisiana., We find, as
stipulated by the parties, that' the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) , and (7) of -the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
R. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The parties stipulated to the following facts. On or
about September 16, 1970, the Charging Party, an
employee of the Respondent, filed a lawsuit in the
Federal District Court, Eastern District, New Orleans
Division, Case 70-2645, which seeks damages from
the Respondent, inter alia, under provisions of the
Jones Act and/or the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, for an alleged on-the-
job injury.
The Charging Party was employed by the Respon-
dent at the time he filed suit against it and was
discharged solely for filing the suit. The Respondent
has maintained a company rule that employees who
file suit against it willibe discharged, except in cases
where such discharge is prevented by law.3
In the suit, the Charging Party claimed that the
injury he allegedly suffered permanently and totally
disabled him from performing all duties on jobs he
has been suited for by training and experience. The
parties agreed that the degree of disability claimed by
the Charging Party in no way entered into the
decision to discharge or the refusal to reinstate him.
However, the parties further agreed that this is
without prejudice to Respondent's position that, for
reasons of disability, the Charging Party would not be
entitled to reinstatement or backpay.
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that protects an employee from
being discharged for availing himself of his rights under either of the
statutes.
192 NLRB No. 29
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel contends, that, by filing a
lawsuit under provisions of- the Jones Act 'and/or the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, the Charging Party,was- engaged in concerted
activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.
The- General Counsel argues that, since both the
Jones `Act and the Longshoremen's and ,. Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act resulted, at least in part,
from the concerted efforts of employees acting
through their labor organizations in lobbying for the
enactment of the two laws, bringing the lawsuit would
be analogous to an individual employee's assertion of
a claim under a collective-bargaining agreement,
which is clearly protected. The General Counsel cites
Bunny Bros. Construction Company'4 ,where , an
individ'u`all.,employee was discharged for submitting a
contract pay' claim, and the Board held that the
discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, since the
employee sought to implement the collective-bargain-
ing ` agreement and the implementation of such an
agreement by an employee is but an exten