477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 221,284 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
In Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland Co., 407 F.2d 881, 888-89, 160 USPQ 715, 721 (CCPA 1969) the court stated that false suggestion requires the existence of likelihood of confusion.