F. L. Emmert Co. v. Moorman Mfg. Co.

10 Cited authorities

International Star Cl. Yacht v. Tommy Hilfiger
146 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1998) Cited 410 times
Holding that it was defendant's burden to prove any deduction for sales not based on the infringing mark as opposed to defendant's own well-known mark and reputation
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 190 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 73 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America
970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 39 times
Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen
496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) Cited 8 times
Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)
Rule 803 - Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness
Fed. R. Evid. 803 Cited 13,032 times 85 Legal Analyses
Recognizing exception to rule against hearsay for records of regularly conducted activities
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,904 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,605 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

F. L. Emmert Co. v. Moorman Mfg. Co.

10 Cited authorities

Holding that it was defendant's burden to prove any deduction for sales not based on the infringing mark as opposed to defendant's own well-known mark and reputation

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

Recognizing exception to rule against hearsay for records of regularly conducted activities

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"