Patent Appeal No. 8058. December 5, 1968. Ralph L. Young, pro se, James W. Dent, Donald J. Rich, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 14 and 16-18 in appellants' application for "Filters" as unpatentable
Patent Appeal No. 8975. August 30, 1973. L. Gaylord Hulbert, Whittemore, Hulbert Belknap, Detroit, Mich., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Robert D. Edmonds, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration
Patent Appeal No. 7265. July 22, 1965. Louis C. Smith, Jr., Francis M. Fazio, New York City, Paul A. Rose, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J.E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. Appellant Dunn with one Proops obtained a series of five patents for improvements in a classic synthesis of acrylic acid esters obtained by reaction of acetylene
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)