Ex Parte Wong et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 24, 2017

13031752 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/031,752 02/22/2011 Karen Natalie WONG A499 5613
36378 7590
VMWARE, INC.
DARRYL SMITH
3401 Hillview Ave.
PALO ALTO, CA 94304
EXAMINER
PHAM, LINH K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipteam @ vmware. com
ipadmin@vmware.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KAREN NATALIE WONG, KATHRYN MURRELL, and
MANASWI SHUKLA
Appeal 2016-007835
Application 13/031,752
Technology Center 2174
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—24, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-
part.
Appeal 2016-007835
Application 13/031,752
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to the Specification, the present invention relates to
computer virtualization. See generally Spec. 1. Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method for managing computing resources in a
virtualized computing environment, comprising:
receiving non-keyboard user input via a graphical
interface of a virtual infrastructure management application
configured to manage the virtualized computing environment
having one or more host computers and one or more virtual
machines executing on each of the one or more host computers;
determining a textual command that is one of a plurality
of textual commands of an application programming interface
(API) of the virtual infrastructure management application, the
textual command executable by the virtual infrastructure
management application to perform action equivalent to the
non-keyboard user input received via the graphical interface;
and
displaying the textual command in a command line
interface of the virtual infrastructure management application,
wherein the textual command is executable within the
command line interface.
References and Rejections
Kekic US 5,999,1795 Dec. 7, 1999
Bellville US 2012/0078869 A1 Mar. 29,2012
Tripathi US 2012/0089981 A1 Apr. 12,2012
Claims 1—6 and 13—18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kekic and Bellville.
Claims 7, 11, 12, 19, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bellville and Tripathi.
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Application 13/031,752
Claims 8—10 and 20—22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bellville, Tripathi, and Kekic.1
ANALYSIS
Claims 1—6 and 13—18
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’
contentions and the evidence of record. We concur with Appellants’
contention that the Examiner erred in finding Kekic teaches “receiving non­
keyboard user input via a graphical interface of a virtual infrastructure
management application configured to manage the virtualized computing
environment having one or more host computers and one or more virtual
machines executing on each of the one or more host computers,” as recited
in independent claim 1 (emphasis added).2 See App. Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 2—3.
Initially, the Examiner cites Kekic’s Figures 3B and 6B, and excerpts
from columns 5 and 23, but does not specifically map the italicized claim
limitation. See Final Act. 4. In response to Appellants’ arguments, the
Examiner also cites Kekic’s Figure 6A, and excerpts from columns 15, 22,
81, and 83, but still does not specifically map the italicized claim limitation.
See Ans. 3. We have reviewed the cited Kekic portions, and they do not
discuss “a virtual infrastructure management application configured to
1 The Examiner cites Bellville and Tripathi for rejecting independent claims
7 and 19 (Final Act. 10—13). Therefore, the rejection of claims 8—10 and
20-22, which depend from claims 7 and 19, also relies on Tripathi as one of
the prior art references. As a result, the Examiner’s omission of Tripathi
(Final Act. 8—10) appears to be a typographical error.
2 Appellants raise additional arguments with respect to this group of claims.
Because the identified issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the
additional arguments.
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manage the virtualized computing environment having one or more host
computers and one or more virtual machines executing on each of the one or
more host computers,” as required by claim 1 (emphasis added). Absent
further explanation from the Examiner, we do not see how the cited Kekic
portions teach the disputed claim limitation.
Because the Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence or
explanation to support the rejection, we are constrained by the record to
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim l.3
Independent claim 13 recites a claim limitation that is substantively
similar to the disputed limitation of claim 1. See claim 13. Therefore, for
similar reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim
13.
We also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 2—6 and 14—18.
Claims 7—12 and 19—24
We disagree with Appellants’ arguments, and agree with and adopt
the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this
appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer to the extent they are consistent with our
analysis below.
On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 7.
3 In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to
determine whether similar to the rejection of claim 7, “a virtual
infrastructure management application configured to manage the virtualized
computing environment having one or more host computers and one or more
virtual machines executing on each of the one or more host computers” is
taught by or would have been obvious in light of the collective teachings of
Kekic and Tripathi. See Final Rej. 7.
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I
Appellants contend Bellville does not teach “textual commands of an
application programming interface (API) of the virtual infrastructure
management application,” as recited in claim 7 (emphasis added). See App.
Br. 13. In particular, Appellants contend:
The text fields of Bellville cited by the Examiner do not teach or
suggest Appellant’s claimed textual command, because they are
not APIs as would be understood by a person skilled in the art.
The Examiner stated that Bellville teaches “the textual
command being one of a plurality of textual commands of an
application programming interface (API) of the virtual
infrastructure management application.” (citing Bellville, para.
0104 and 0110; Fig. 3). (Final Office Action, p. 5). The
Examiner contends that a drop-down box that contains
selectable search parameters reads on Applicant’s claimed
textual command being part of an API of the virtual
infrastructure management application. The Microsoft
Computer Dictionary, however, defines an API as “a set of
routines used by an application program to direct the
performance of procedures by the computer’s operating
system.” (Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 33,
lines 6-9). The “selectable search parameters” of Bellville are
not “a set of routines”, nor do the selectable search parameters
“direct the performance of procedures by the computer’s
operating system.” Rather, the search parameters are input to a
search engine that searches a database for process control
information to limit a search. (Bellville, para. 0105-0106).
Therefore, the Examiner errs in concluding that the text fields
of Bellville are APIs.
As stated above, the “selectable search parameters” of Bellville
are not “a set of routines”, nor do the selectable search
parameters “direct the performance of procedures by the
computer’s operating system.” Rather, the search parameters
are input to a search engine that searches a database for process
control information to limit a search. (Bellville, para. 0105-
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0106). As such, the selectable search parameters of Bellville do
not teach or suggest Appellant’s claimed textual commands of
an API of the virtual infrastructure management application.
App. Br. 10, 13.
Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the
claim, as the claim recites “textual commands of an application
programming interface (API) of the virtual infrastructure management
application” (emphasis added). Therefore, the claim does not require the
claimed textual commands to be APIs, as Appellants argue (App. Br. 10,
13).4
II
Appellants argue the Examiner has not provided any rationale for
modifying Bellville’s method to incorporate Tripathi’s feature. See App. Br.
13-14.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[t]he combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid
under § 103” and “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.” Id. at 418—19.
4 We understand the Examiner maps the claim element “an application
programming interface (API)” to Bellville’s application 300 (Final Act. 11—
12), and Appellants do not contend the Examiner’s mapping is incorrect.
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The Examiner has provided articulated reasoning with a rational
underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to
combine the teachings of Bellville and Tripathi. See Final Act. 12—13. In
particular, the Examiner finds one skilled in the art would have modified
Bellville’s method to incorporate Tripathi’s feature “to allow multiple guest
operating systems executing in a host operating system without disrupting
network connectivity.” Final Act. 13. The Examiner’s reasoning means the
proposed modification would have improved network connectivity by the
redundancy nature of having one or more host computers and one or more
virtual machines executing on each of the one or more host computers.
Appellants do not persuasively show why such reasoning is incorrect. In
particular, Appellants’ assertion that “[t]he Examiner has not provided any
articulated reasoning for modifying the search user interface of Bellville to
be a command line interface of a virtual infrastructure management
application, as claimed by Appellant” (App. Br. 14; see also App. Br. 13) is
not directed to the proposed combination, as the Examiner finds—and
Appellants do not offer any substantive arguments to dispute—Bellville
teaches the claimed “command line interface of a virtual infrastructure
management application.” See Final Act. 11; In re Baxter Travenol Labs.,
952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court [or
this Board] to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an
appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”).
The Examiner’s findings and conclusion are reasonable because the
skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together
like pieces of a puzzle” since the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21. Appellants do not
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present evidence that the resulting arrangements would have been “uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an
unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that applying Tripathi’s
feature in the Bellville method would have predictably used prior art
elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement.
See KSR, 550 U.S. a 417; Final Act. 12-13.
Because Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 7, and independent
claim 19 for similar reasons.
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 11, 12, 23, and 24. Appellants merely assert those claims are
patentable for the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 7 (App. Br.
14), and such arguments are unpersuasive as discussed above.
Regarding dependent claims 8—10 and 20—22, Appellants also assert
“neither Bellville nor Kekic teaches or suggests any type of virtual
infrastructure management application configured to management a
virtualized computing environment having virtual machines executing on
host computers.” App. Br. 12. Appellants’ general assertion is unpersuasive
of error. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“A statement which merely points
out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate
patentability of the claim.”); see also In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
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Application 13/031,752
Cir. 2011) (holding that “the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art”). Therefore, and for similar reasons
discussed above with respect to claim 7, we also sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 8—10 and 20-22.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6 and 13—18.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7—12 and 19—24.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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