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Ex Parte Woehrle et al

13825300 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2019)
Ex Parte Woehrle et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.

    848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 746 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of routine business practice can be used to prove that a reference was accessible

  3. Ball Aerosol and Specialty v. Ltd. Brands

    555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 81 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding summary judgment of noninfringement to be appropriate where infringement required a particular product configuration but where there was no evidence that the infringing configuration had ever existed

  4. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  5. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  6. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 30 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"

  7. Application of Nomiya

    509 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1975)   Cited 28 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 74-514. February 6, 1975. Paul M. Craig, Jr., Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; R. V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1-8 and 33

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)