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Ex Parte Wells

11 Cited authorities

  1. Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.

    150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 196 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding award of damages for breach of contract was properly based on licensing fee established by expert testimony

  2. E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.

    343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 126 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the "court's task is not to limit claim language to exclude particular devices because they do no serve a perceived 'purpose' of the invention. Rather, the district court's function is to interpret claims according to their plain language unless the patentee has chosen to be his own lexicographer in the specification or has clearly disclaimed coverage during prosecution. An invention may possess a number of advantages or purposes, and there is no requirement that every claim directed to that invention be limited to encompass all of them."

  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter

  4. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  5. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  6. Besinga v. U.S.

    14 F.3d 1356 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the “broad powers of Congress under the Territory Clause are inconsistent with the application of heightened judicial scrutiny” and finding several potential rational bases, including conserving finances, to support the law

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,997 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)