Ex Parte Weidenhaupt et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 21, 2017

12092099 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/092,099 04/30/2008 Klaus Weidenhaupt 2005P02861WOUS 8537
24737 7590 03/23/2017
PTTTT TPS TNTFT T FfTTTAT PROPFRTY fr STANDARDS
EXAMINER
465 Columbus Avenue PATEL, NEHA
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
marianne. fox @ philips, com
debbie.henn @philips .com
patti. demichele @ Philips, com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KLAUS WEIDENHAUPT and CHARLES LAGOR
Appeal 2014—009803
Application 12/092,099
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Klaus Weidenhaupt and Charles Lagor (Appellants) seek review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 2—18 and 21—23, the only
claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed June 5, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed September 16,
2014), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 17, 2014), and Final
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed December 27, 2013).
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
The Appellants invented a clinical workflow management and decision
support system and method. Specification 1:9.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 21, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
21. A method of clinical workflow management and decision
making comprising:
[1] receiving clinical information from a hospital information
system,
the clinical information pertaining to a particular clinical
problem of a patient under consideration;
[2] creating, by a computer processor, a clinical workflow care
plan based on the clinical information,
the clinical workflow care plan comprising:
(i) one or more ideal clinical actions;
and
(ii) a timing for an occurrence of the one or more
ideal clinical actions as a function of the clinical
information and the particular clinical problem;
[3] determining, by the computer processor, previous and
current clinical actions of the clinical workflow care plan;
[4] providing, by the computer processor, a notification based
on a result of the determining;
[5] repeatedly examining whether the current clinical actions
adhere to the clinical workflow care plan;
[6] determining, based on the repeatedly examining, by the
computer processor, suggested next step information critical to
diagnostic and therapeutic decisions to be made by one or more
healthcare providers in conjunction with treatment of the
particular clinical problem,
and
2
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
[7] providing access to the clinical workflow care plan via a
graphical user interface that comprises a plurality of distinct
interactive display regions,
wherein the plurality of display regions are all contained
within a single screen.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Wilkes US 2004/0078231 A1
Kameda US 6,876,972 B1
Grigsby US 2005/0215867 A1
Miikkulainen US 6,988,088 B1
Apr. 22, 2004
Apr. 5, 2005
Sept. 29, 2005
Jan. 17, 2006
Claim 23 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Wilkes.
Claims 21, 5—9, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby and Kameda.
Claims 23, 2-4, 10-12, and 15—18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Grigsby, Kameda, and Wilkes.
Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby, Kameda, Wilkes, and Miikkulainen.
Claims 2—18 and 21—23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to non—statutory subject matter.
ISSUES
The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether the art describes or
suggests a graphical user interface that comprises a plurality of distinct
3
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
interactive display regions, wherein the plurality of display regions are all
contained within a single screen. The issues of statutory subject matter turn
primarily on whether the claims are directed to more than conceptual advice
on managing healthcare.
FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to the Prior Art
Grigsby
01. Grigsby is directed to managing patient treatment and
associated healthcare worker tasks. Grigsby para. 2.
Kameda
02. Kameda is directed to aiding to make a medical care schedule
and/or record, which can aid or navigate the person, who makes
up the medical care schedule and/or record such as a medical
doctor, a nurse, etc., to make an appropriate medical care schedule
and/or record easily and speedily. Kameda 3:25—34.
03. Kameda Fig. 7 shows a single screen with various distinct
interactive display regions (i.e. 601 thru 614). Kameda, Fig. 7.
Wilkes
04. Wilkes is directed to integrating clinical documentation
including nursing orders, patient treatment orders, and providing
4
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
decision support, including clinical decision support, during the
treatment of a patient. Wilkes para. 3.
ANALYSIS
Claims 21, 5—9, and 22 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Grigsby and Kameda
The sole issue under contention is whether the art describes or suggests
graphical user interface that comprises a plurality of distinct interactive
display regions, wherein the plurality of display regions are all contained
within a single screen.
Kameda Fig. 7 shows a single screen with various distinct interactive
display regions (i.e. 601 thru 614). Kameda Fig. 7. See Final Act. 5—6.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that
persons skilled in the art would understand that “a graphical
user interface that comprises a plurality of distinct interactive
display regions, wherein the plurality of display regions are all
contained within a single screen” means that the interactive
display regions of each data category (example categories
include: the clinical findings region (2), the differential
diagnosis region (3), the protocol and time map region ( 4), and
the suggested next step region (5)), are spatially distinct, as the
user interface is “subdivided into various [distinct] regions.”
(See Specification, p. 5,11. 11-26; Fig. 2). In contrast, the
execution times of medical actions are superimposed in all
areas of the text-based table of Kameda, and the execution time
category overlaps with the protocols and suggested next clinical
step procedures, without having spatially distinct display
regions for each category: execution time of medical action,
protocol, and suggested next clinical steps. (See Kameda, Fig.
7). Thus, Kameda teaches a text-based table with spatially
5
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
overlapping display regions for distinct data categories, and
does not teach “a graphical user interface that comprises a
plurality of distinct interactive display regions,” as recited in
claim 21.
App. Br. 9 (emphasis omitted). At the very least, a cursory look at Kameda
Fig. 7 would at least suggest to one of ordinary skill the idea of
incorporating plural distinct interactive display regions in a single screen.
Further, the sole distinction is in the non-functional content of the
display regions, which cannot distinguish the claim over the art. The
process in no way depends on the content of the display regions and the
content of the display regions in no way depends on the steps in the claim.
See King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“The rationale behind this line of cases is preventing the indefinite
patenting of known products by the simple inclusion of novel, yet
functionally unrelated limitations.”)
Still further, the argument attempts to incorporate limitations from the
Specification into the claims. And the portion Appellants cite, Specification
5:11—26, describes one embodiment of the invention. App. Br. 9.
Though understanding the claim language may be aided by
explanations contained in the written description, it is important
not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the
claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the
written description may not be read into a claim when the claim
language is broader than the embodiment.
Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
More to the point, the limitation at issue is a graphical user interface that
comprises a plurality of distinct interactive display regions, wherein the
6
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
plurality of display regions are all contained within a single screen. No
implementation is recited or narrowed as to the manner of distinction,
interaction, or containment. Kameda Fig. 7 on its face shows plural distinct
rectangular regions, each of which interactively accepts input data that can
be altered interactively, all of which are within the perimeter of a larger
window, not to say the single screen itself that contains the window.
Claims 23, 2—4, 10—12, and 15—18 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby, Kameda, and Wilkes
Appellants present similar arguments to those in support of claim 21
which are equally unpersuasive here.
Claims 13 and 14 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Grigsby, Kameda, Wilkes, and Miikkulainen
Appellants rely on the arguments in support of claim 21.
Claim 23 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Wilkes
We do not reach this rejection as it is cumulative with the above
rejection.
7
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
Claims 2—18 and 21—23 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non—
statutory subject matter
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, []
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? [] To answer that question,
[] consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
While the Court in Alice made a direct finding as to what the claims were
directed to, we find that this case’s claims themselves and the Specification
provide enough information to inform one as to what they are directed to.
The preamble to claim 21 recites that it is a method of clinical workflow
management and decision making. The seven steps in claim 21 result in
providing access to the clinical workflow care plan. The Specification at 1:9
8
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
recites that the invention relates to a clinical workflow management and
decision support system and method. Thus, all this evidence shows that
claim 21 is directed to clinical workflow management, i.e. healthcare
management. This is essentially the Examiner’s finding. Ans. 4.
It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski in particular, that
the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Analogous to the
risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of healthcare management is a
fundamental medical practice long prevalent in our system of medicine. The
use of healthcare management is also a building block of the medical
business. Thus, healthcare management, like hedging, is an “abstract idea”
beyond the scope of §101. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the “abstract ideas” category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of healthcare
management at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of “abstract
ideas” as the Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct.
at 2357.
The remaining claims merely describe what is presented and how often.
We conclude that the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
concept.
9
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. . . . Nor is limiting the use of
an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
As the Examiner finds, taking the claim elements separately, the function
performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely
conventional. Using a computer to receive data, create a schedule of actions,
determine actions and notify one of such, compare data, look up possible
steps, and provide access to this data amounts to electronic data query and
retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these
computer functions are well—understood, routine, conventional activities
10
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
previously known to the industry. In short, each step does no more than
require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants’ method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. Viewed as a whole, Appellants’ method claims
simply recite the concept of healthcare management as performed by a
generic computer. The method claims do not, for example, purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims
at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea of healthcare management using some unspecified, generic
computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 134 S. Ct. at
2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “wam[ed] . . . against” interpreting § 101
“in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
11
Appeal 2014-009803
Application 12/092,099
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 21, 5—9, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby and Kameda is proper.
The rejection of claims 23, 2—4, 10-12, and 15—18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Grigsby, Kameda, and Wilkes is proper.
The rejection of claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grigsby, Kameda, Wilkes, and Miikkulainen is proper.
The rejection of claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Wilkes is not reached.
The rejection of claims 2—18 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non—statutory subject matter is proper.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 2—18 and 21—23 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED
12