Ex parte WATTS et al.

7 Cited authorities

  1. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 67 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."
  2. In re Bell

    991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1375. April 20, 1993. Robert P. Blackburn, Chiron Corp., Emeryville, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Debra A. Shetka and Thomas E. Ciotti, Morrison Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, and Donald S. Chisum, Morrison Foerster, Seattle, WA. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Of counsel were John W. Dewhirst, Lee E. Barrett, Richard E. Schafer and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the Patent

  3. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims
  4. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 30 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"
  5. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  7. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)