Ex Parte Wang et al

16 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Koito Manufacturing Co., v. Turn-Key-Tech

    381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 142 times
    Holding that a challenger failed to meet its burden of proving a prior art reference anticipated the patent claims when it "failed to provide any testimony or other evidence that would demonstrate to the jury how that reference met the limitations of the claims"
  3. In re Skvorecz

    580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 50 times
    Finding that the phrase "at the separation" "d[id] not require further antecedent basis" because "a person skilled in the field of the invention would understand the claim when viewed in the context of the specification"
  4. In re Packard

    751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 36 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Addressing the issues separately
  5. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester
  6. In re Giannelli

    739 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reversing affirmance of examiner's obviousness determination where the Board's analysis "contained no explanation why or how [a skilled artisan] would modify" the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention
  7. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  8. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims
  9. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection
  10. In re Baxter

    656 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 19 times
    Explaining that "comprising" is a term of art meaning that the named elements are essential, but that other elements may be added and still form a construct
  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,363 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  12. Section 132 - Notice of rejection; reexamination

    35 U.S.C. § 132   Cited 309 times   47 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting addition of "new matter"
  13. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  14. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  15. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)