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Ex Parte Theresa et al

12570827 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2016)
Ex Parte Theresa et al

18 Cited authorities

  1. Brown v. 3M

    265 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 178 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims did "not require elaborate interpretation"

  2. King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.

    616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 89 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claimed step of informing someone about an inherent property of a method was printed matter

  3. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner

    778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 130 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an earlier species disclosure in the prior art defeats any generic claim

  4. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  5. In re Ngai

    367 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that allowing claims where the printed matter was the only novel contribution would allow "anyone [to] continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new instruction sheet to the product"

  6. In re Gulack

    703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that even though the claim included printed matter, the printed matter was still entitled to patentable weight because there was a functional relationship between the printed matter and its underlying substrate

  7. In re Lovin

    652 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

    No. 2010–1499. 2011-12-6 In re Jeff LOVIN, Robert Adams, and Dan Kuruzar. James R. Burdett, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Richard B. Lazarus; and Thomas J. Donovan, of Chicago, IL.Scott C. Weidenfeller, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Nathan K. Kelley, Associate Solicitor. Before BRYSON

  8. In re Jie Xiao

    462 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

    Serial No. 11/161,741 2011-1195 10-12-2011 IN RE JIE XIAO JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, for appellee. With him on the brief were LYNNE E. PETTIGREW and SCOTT C. WEIDENFELLER. LOURIE NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor

  9. In re A. G. S. Food Systems, Inc.

    14 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980)   Cited 13 times

    Bankruptcy No. 80-00415. Complaint No. 80-0087. November 26, 1980. J. Richard Kelly, Greenville, S.C., for plaintiff. James H. Cassidy, Greenville, S.C., for defendant. ORDER J. BRATTON DAVIS, Bankruptcy Judge. This matter is before the court on the complaint of United Beef Packers which seeks to recover certain beef products from the trustee. On May 22, 1980 the plaintiff delivered to the debtor, on credit terms, a load of beef having a value of $53,558.64. Subsequently, the plaintiff became concerned

  10. In re Heck

    699 F.2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that "[t]he use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions"

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  13. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  14. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  15. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  16. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  17. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  18. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)