Ex Parte SUZUKI

11 Cited authorities

  1. Conoco, Inc. v. Energy Envtl. Intern

    460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 242 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that applicant's argument that "a fatty acid wax was not the same as a metal stearate" clearly disavowed metal stearates as equivalents, but did not surrender all fatty acid wax equivalents
  2. Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.

    457 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 93 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claim invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 for claiming subject matter that was “non-overlapping” with the claim from which it depended
  3. Mannesmann Demag v. Engineered Metal Prod

    793 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 158 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an overall transitional phrase does not trump later transitional language
  4. In re Packard

    751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 36 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Addressing the issues separately
  5. In re Bartfeld

    925 F.2d 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 9 times

    No. 90-1376. February 20, 1991. John P. White, Cooper Dunham, of New York City, argued, for appellants. With him on the brief was Thomas G. Carulli. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on the brief were Richard E. Schafer, Teddy S. Gron, and Lee B. Barrett, Associate Solicitors. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before RICH, MAYER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. RICH, Circuit Judge

  6. Application of Miller

    441 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 11 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8444. May 13, 1971. Jay P. Friedenson, Morristown, N.J., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FORD, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4-18 in appellant's

  7. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,363 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)