Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive
Patent Appeal No. 7142. July 9, 1964. Laurence Laurence, Washington, D.C. (Dean Laurence, Herbert I. Sherman, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. WORLEY, Chief Judge. Zenitz appeals from the affirmance by the Board of Appeals of the rejection of claims 3, 5, 9 through 12 and 21 of his patent application
Patent Appeal No. 7980. June 27, 1968. R.J. Lasker, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND and KIRKPATRICK, Judges. Senior District Judge Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 10-19 of application serial
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)