No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
No. 92-1446. December 11, 1995. Harold C. Wegner, Foley Lardner, of Washington, D.C., argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Herbert I. Cantor and Douglas P. Mueller. Of counsel was Don J. Pelto. Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, Lee E. Barrett, Associate Solicitor, John W. Dewhirst, Associate Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor and Richard E. Schafer, Associate Solicitor
Appeal No. 79-586. May 15, 1980. James J. Farrell, New York City, attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, and Trademarks; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and NEWMAN, Judge. The Honorable Bernard Newman, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. NEWMAN, Judge. This is an
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)