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Ex Parte Salgo et al

10283761 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2018)
Ex Parte Salgo et al

26 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,557 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 381 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  3. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar

    935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 395 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding construction of § 112, ¶ 1 requires separate written description and enablement requirements

  4. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.

    688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 159 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding no motivation to combine where "doctors were not using the disclosed devices and methods to heal wounds with negative pressure because they did not believe that these devices were capable of such healing"

  5. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. TWi Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

    773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 145 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[t]he claimed . . . parameters . . . [were] inherent properties of the obvious . . . formulation," and thus "[t]he reduced food effect was an inherent result of [a composition] even if it was previously not known in the prior art that a food effect existed"

  6. Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.

    821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 124 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding a reply brief and declaration exceeded the proper scope for a reply because they cited "a number of non-patent literature references which were not relied upon to support unpatentability in the Petition"

  7. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 147 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  8. Randall Mfg. v. Rea

    733 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 84 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reversing finding of non-obviousness where court “narrowly focus[ed] on the four prior-art references” and ignored record evidence of “the knowledge and perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art” to explain motivation to combine or modify references

  9. Custom Accessories v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus

    807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 179 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that upon reissue, the burden of proving invalidity is "made heavier"

  10. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,386 times   1048 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  12. Section 132 - Notice of rejection; reexamination

    35 U.S.C. § 132   Cited 310 times   47 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting addition of "new matter"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)