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Ex Parte Richards

14762345 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2019)
Ex Parte Richards

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,551 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. United States v. Adams

    383 U.S. 39 (1966)   Cited 479 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to ignore long-accepted factors in the field of wet batters to arrive at the claimed invention

  3. KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.

    223 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 222 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the article "a" would only be limited to its singular meaning when the inventor evinced a clear intent to so limit it

  4. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L

    437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 174 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Holding that non-inventor's notebook did not corroborate reduction to practice because the non-inventor "did not testify regarding the notebook or the genuineness of its contents" and the district court was therefore "clearly reliant on the inventor to help identify the author of specific entries made in [the non-inventor's] notebook"

  5. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 136 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"

  6. Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors

    508 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 63 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an expert's statement "in conclusory fashion" that two methods were not "significantly different" is the type of "cursory conclusion" that "will not withstand summary judgment."

  7. In re Urbanski

    809 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that loss of key functionality can be overcome by evidence that a POSA would nevertheless be motivated to combine references

  8. IN RE FOUT

    675 F.2d 297 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 24 times
    Holding preamble of Jepson-type claim to be admitted prior art where applicant's specification credited another as the inventor of the subject matter of the preamble

  9. In re Self

    671 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Appeal No. 81-542. February 18, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 22, 1982. Roland T. Bryan, Stamford, Conn., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)