Ex parte Rebhan et al.

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Woodruff

    919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claimed invention obvious because claimed range (“more than 5% to about 25%” carbon monoxide) abutted range of prior art (“about 1–5%” carbon monoxide)
  2. Application of Marzocchi

    439 F.2d 220 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times
    Involving the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph
  3. In re Grasselli

    713 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding that unexpected results “limited to sodium only” were not commensurate in scope with claims to a catalyst having “an alkali metal”
  4. In re Johnson

    747 F.2d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 14 times

    Appeal No. 84-952. November 9, 1984. Terence P. Strobough, Philadelphia, Pa., argued for appellant. Harris A. Pitlick, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Circuit Judge, and NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge. NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  5. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  6. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield
  7. In re Strahilevitz

    668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 9 times

    Appeal No. 81-563. January 15, 1982. J. Philip Polster, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board") sustaining the rejection of claims 36-48 as unsupported by an adequate disclosure required

  8. Application of Rainer

    377 F.2d 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7668. June 2, 1967. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C. (C. Edward Parker, Duncan, S.C., of counsel), for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. The appeal is from decisions of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 2-6, 8-12, 17, 20, and 48-59 in application serial No. 12,339, filed March

  9. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)