Appeal No. 84-952. November 9, 1984. Terence P. Strobough, Philadelphia, Pa., argued for appellant. Harris A. Pitlick, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Circuit Judge, and NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge. NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
Appeal No. 81-563. January 15, 1982. J. Philip Polster, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board") sustaining the rejection of claims 36-48 as unsupported by an adequate disclosure required
Patent Appeal No. 7668. June 2, 1967. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C. (C. Edward Parker, Duncan, S.C., of counsel), for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. The appeal is from decisions of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 2-6, 8-12, 17, 20, and 48-59 in application serial No. 12,339, filed March
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)