Ex Parte Rangadass

11 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,853 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.

    150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 196 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding award of damages for breach of contract was properly based on licensing fee established by expert testimony
  3. In re Yamamoto

    740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 110 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation “serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified”
  4. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  5. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2
  6. In re Ngai

    367 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that allowing claims where the printed matter was the only novel contribution would allow "anyone [to] continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new instruction sheet to the product"
  7. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  8. In re Nuijten

    515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

    No. 2006-1371. February 11, 2008. Jack E. Haken, Philips Intellectual Property Standards, of Briarcliff Manor, NY, filed a petition for rehearing en banc for the appellant. Of counsel was Larry Liberchuk. Stephen Walsh, Acting Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, VA, filed a response to the petition for the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With him on the response were Thomas W. Krause and Raymond T. Chen, Associate Solicitors. Before MICHEL

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,012 times   1009 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)

  11. Section 41.52 - Rehearing

    37 C.F.R. § 41.52   Cited 7 times   9 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by