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Ex parte Rajala et al.

08452747 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 12, 1998)
Ex parte Rajala et al.

12 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,179 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar

    935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 395 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding construction of § 112, ¶ 1 requires separate written description and enablement requirements

  3. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 67 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."

  4. In re Kaslow

    707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that prior demonstration of computerized supermarket UPC code system was prior use under meaning of Section 102(b)

  5. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  6. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  7. In re Young

    927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Observing that in an obviousness inquiry, courts consider a prior art "reference for what it disclose in relation to the claimed invention."

  8. Application of Warner

    379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U

  9. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  10. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,363 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)