Ex Parte Radermacher et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 15, 2016

12075098 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 15, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/075,098 03/05/2008
95683 7590 08/17/2016
Ley dig, Voit & Mayer, Ltd, (Frankfurt office)
Two Prudential Plaza, Suite 4900
180 North Stetson Avenue
Chicago, IL 60601-6731
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Klaus Radermacher
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
812840 9771
EXAMINER
VU, QUOC THAI NGOC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2642
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
chgpatent@leydig.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KLAUS RADERMACHER and NICHOLAS BAMBOS 1
Appeal2014-009802
Application 12/075,098
Technology Center 2600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1-19. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify Deutsche Telekom AG and the Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University as the real parties in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2014-009802
Application 12/075,098
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants' invention is directed to predictive network service
provisioning for mobile users. Spec. 3. In a disclosed approach, data is
prepositioned closer to where the user is predicted to be (i.e., to a service
provider that services the predicted location). Spec. 5. As an example, if a
user's scheduling information is accessed and it is determined that the user
will be in a certain geographic region serviced by a service provider, data
predicted to be used/accessed by the user is prepositioned from the user's
primary service provider to the predicted service provider. Spec. 4.
According to the Specification, the disclosed approach "greatly reduces data
access latency." Spec. 6.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics:
1. A method for predictive computer network service
prov1s10mng compnsmg:
obtaining personal schedule information of a user located
in a first geographic location and made available on a network;
providing a service session, including functional modules
and relevant data particular to the user, that exists autonomously
on the network and independently from a home base service
provider of the user,
providing access to the service session to a plurality of
different types of service providers through a service layer which
exists on top of an infrastructure of the network such that the
service session is switchable among the service providers for
assembly on demand at a network neighborhood that the user is
in,
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Appeal2014-009802
Application 12/075,098
predicting a future attribute of the user from the personal
schedule information, the predicted future attribute including a
future second geographic location of the user, and
providing a service to the user prior to the user arriving at
the second geographic location using the predicted future
attribute in combination with publicly available information on
the internet.
The Examiner's Rejections
1. Claims 1-8 and 10-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Gopalakrishnan et al. (US 2002/0198991 Al;
Dec. 26, 2002) ("Gopalakrishnan"); Ford et al. (US 6,480,830B1; Nov. 12,
2002) ("Ford"); and Maes (US 2005/0137981 Al; June 23, 2005). Final
Act. 3-9.
2. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Gopalakrishnan, Ford, Maes, and Igarashi et al. (US
2001/0053694 Al; Dec. 20, 2001) ("Igarashi"). Final Act. 10.
Issues on Appeal
1. Did the Examiner err in finding Maes teaches or suggests a
service session "that exists autonomously on the network and independently
from a home base service provider of the user," as recited in claim 1?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding Maes teaches or suggests
"providing access to the service session to a plurality of different types of
service providers through a service layer which exists on top of an
infrastructure of the network such that the service session is switchable
among the service providers for assembly on demand at a network
neighborhood that the user is in," as recited in claim 1?
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ANALYSIS 2
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Maes teaches or
suggests the disputed limitations of claim 1. App. Br. 4--5. In particular,
Appellants assert Figure 1 of Maes illustrates "that any services from other
service providers always go through the home base service provider." App.
Br. 4. Additionally, Appellants assert Figure 3 of Maes illustrates that the
service session does not exist autonomously and independent from a home
base provider because there must be agreements among the home base
service provider and another access provider, as well as an identity provider
in order to allow identity information for a user to be available when
switching access providers. App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 2.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error because, as the Examiner
explains, Maes teaches a user may be able to communicate with a service
provider even when switching from a home base service provider to another
access provider. Ans. 2-3. Specifically, in Figure 3 of Maes, the Examiner
identifies either access provider 302 or 304 as being the claimed home base
service provider whereas the other provider provides the service session
autonomously and independently of the home base service provider.
Ans. 2-3 (citing Maes i-fi-124, 41--44, Fig. 3). We agree with the Examiner's
findings.
2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
April 9, 2014 ("App. Br."); the Reply Brief, filed September 17, 2014
("Reply Br."); the Examiner's Answer, mailed on July 17, 2014 ("Ans.");
and the Final Office Action ("Final Act."), mailed on January 16, 2014, from
which this Appeal is taken.
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Application 12/075,098
Further, the Examiner finds, and we agree, the agreements of Maes
are related to the user's identity to facilitate routing the communications
between the user and a service provider. Ans. 3 (citing Maes i-fi-142, 45--47).
Additionally, to the extent Appellants contend the existence of an agreement
between service providers prevents a service session from existing
autonomously and independent from a home base service provider, we note
Maes teaches the access provider may have an agreement in place allowing
identity providers access to identity mapping information. Maes i-fi-1 42, 45.
In other words, Maes teaches, or at least suggests, that such agreements are
not required.
For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellants assert it is "unclear
how the Examiner believes that any service session created by the service
provider 310 or another service provider would include functional modules
and relevant data particular to the user, as required by claim 1." Reply
Br. 2-3. We decline to consider this argument, because Appellants do not
provide a basis that this argument is responsive to the Examiner's Answer or
show good cause for its untimely presentation. See 3 7 C.F .R. § 41.41 (b )(2)
(2013) ("Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised in the
appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the examiner's
answer ... will not be considered by the Board for purposes of the present
appeal, unless good cause is shown.").
Appellants also contend:
Maes thus also fails to disclose or suggest a service session that
is switchable among different service providers and can be
assembled on demand ... at a network neighborhood that the
user is in ... [and] Maes merely describes typical exchanges of
data across a physical network and therefore also does not
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Application 12/075,098
disclose or suggest a service layer that exists on top of an
infrastructure of a network ....
App. Br. 4--5; Reply Br. 3.
Appellants, however, do not provide persuasive evidence in support of
these assertions. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) requires more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Further, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Maes teaches a user can
switch from one access provider to another while still maintaining the same
interactions with a service provider. Ans. 4 (citing Maes i-f 44 ). By sending,
or otherwise making available, session management information to the
service provider, the Examiner finds Maes teaches or suggests providing
access to a service session to a plurality of different types of service
providers such that the service session is switchable among the service
providers for assembly on demand at a network neighborhood that the user
1s m. Id. Appellants do not persuasively rebut the Examiner's findings.
Additionally, the Examiner finds, and we agree, there are no physical
relative positions between a "service layer" and "an infrastructure network."
Ans. 5. Rather, the Examiner finds, and we agree, the claim language of "a
service layer that exists on top of an infrastructure of a network" is a concept
based on engineering diagrams. Ans. 5. The Examiner interprets the
limitation as a "'service layer' exists to operate 'an infrastructure of a
network' to provide service to the user." Ans. 5. Appellants do not apprise
us of error with the Examiner's interpretation, but rather attempt to import
limitations from the Specification (e.g., Figure lB). Reply Br. 3. Although
the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the
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specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181,
1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent
claim 1 and claims 2-19, which depend therefrom and were not argued
separately with particularity. See App. Br. 5.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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