Ex Parte Pinto et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 11, 2016

13208186 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/208,186 08/11/2011
22879 7590 08/15/2016
HP Inc,
3390 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 35
FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Sweekar Hillary Pinto
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
82729100 7502
EXAMINER
MENDA YE, KIDEST H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2457
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/15/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ipa.mail@hp.com
barbl@hp.com
yvonne.bailey@hp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SWEEKAR HILLARY PINTO, GOVINDARAJ ANAND,
BINH TRUONG, SANKAR RAM SUNDARESAN,
and KUMAR SW AMY VK
Appeal2014-008464
Application 13/208, 186
Technology Center 2400
Before JOHN A. EVANS, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
rejection of claims 1-20, which are all the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Hewlett-Packard
Development Company, LP. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2014-008464
Application 13/208, 186
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants' present application relates to a client side caching of
media content. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal and reads as follows:
1. A method for client side caching, the method comprising:
with a client system, running a proxy server caching
application designed for execution on a proxy server;
with a content presentation application running on said
client system, accessing content from a server communicatively
coupled to said client system; and
with said proxy caching application, transparently caching
said content into a cache system of said client system.
The Examiner's Rejections
Claims 1--4, 8-10, 13, 14, and 16-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Ayloo (US 2011/0167486 Al; July 7, 2011)
and Gulkis (US 2006/0070090 Al; Mar. 30, 2006). Ans 2.
Claims 5, 6, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ayloo, Gulkis, and van den Oord (US 2003/0041147 Al;
Feb. 27, 2003). Ans 2.
Claims 7 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ayloo, Gulkis, and Iyengar (US 2008/0034165 Al; Feb.
7, 2008). Ans 2.
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Application 13/208, 186
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because the
combination of Ayloo and Gulkis does not teach or suggest "with a client
system, running a proxy server caching application designed for execution
on a proxy server." App. Br. 9-12; Reply Br. 4-8. In particular, Appellants
argue the Examiner concedes Ayloo does not teach this limitation (App. Br.
10-11 ), and Gulkis teaches a client-side caching application that is designed
for execution on the client, not on a proxy server. Id. Appellants argue
Gulkis teaches the caching application receives information from the server,
indicating that it is not designed to run on a proxy server. Id.
Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner
finds, and we agree, that Gulkis teaches a proxy server application running
on a client computer. Ans. 19 (citing Gulkis, Figs. 1, 2A, 2b, ii 23).
Specifically, Gulkis teaches a client 40 executing a proxy application that
operates as an intermediary between a server 20 and scanners 50 and 60.
Gulkis, Fig. 2A, ii 23. The proxy application corresponds to a Twain
application on the server (Gulkis ii 23), which suggests that the proxy
application could also be executed on the server. We, therefore, are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Ayloo and
Gulkis teaches or suggests "with a client system, running a proxy server
caching application designed for execution on a proxy server."2
2 In the event of further prosecution, Appellants and the Examiner may wish
to consider whether "with a client system, running a proxy server caching
application designed for execution on a proxy server" as recited in the
claims is sufficiently definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R.
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Application 13/208, 186
Claim 4
Claim 4 recites "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein said cached content
comprises a cache header indicating a period of time that said cached
content should remain in said cache system before being discarded."
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4 because Ayloo
does not disclose this limitation. App. Br. 14-15; Reply Br. 10-11. In
particular, Appellants argue Ayloo teaches a "time to live" for
advertisements, but does not teach that the time to live is part of a cache
header. App. Br. 14. Appellants argue that "time to live" could be part of a
header or it could be a parameter in a caching system and, therefore, Ayloo
does not teach the disputed limitation. Reply Br. 10.
Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 4. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Ayloo teaches the cache
stores a "time to live" for each advertisement. Ans. 22 (citing Ayloo iii! 31,
32, 54). An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that "time to live" is
often, if not usually, stored in a header. Ans. 22. Appellants argue that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would not understand that "time to live" must be
present in a cache header. Reply Br. 10. However, the Examiner's rejection
is an obviousness rejection and the issue is not whether an ordinarily skilled
artisan would understand that time to live "must" be found in a cache
header, as argued by Appellants. Id. Instead, the issue is whether Ayloo
teaches or suggests time to live in a header to an ordinarily skilled artisan.
Appellants have not identified persuasive evidence in the record that refutes
§ 4 l .50(b ), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do
so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02.
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Application 13/208, 186
the Examiner's findings. Accordingly, we adopt the Examiner's finding that
an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that "time to live" is
frequently, if not usually, included in a header, and Ayloo therefore suggests
information stored in the header as claimed. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 4.
Claim 14
Claim 14 recites "[t]he system of claim 8, wherein said client system
is a simplified computing system designed primarily for presentation of said
content." Appellants argue the Examiner erred because a "simplified
computing device" is "a computing device with less than full functionality
[that] is designed primarily for displaying media content to a user." App.
Br. 15 (citing Spec. iJ 18). Appellants argue the Specification defines the
term in this manner and distinguishes the simplified computing device from
"a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a tablet computer, or a mobile
smart phone." App. Br. 15 (citing Spec. iJ 26).
Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. The
Examiner finds, and we agree, that Ayloo teaches a client device that may be
a mobile telephone, a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, a
notebook computer, or any other mobile computing device. Ans. 24 (citing
Ayloo iJ 57). As Appellants admit, simplified computing devices were
known in the art around the time of Appellants' application. See Spec. iii! 1,
2. An ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood from Ayloo that the
client device could be any of the listed devices, as well as "any other mobile
computing device," including a simplified computing device as that term is
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Appeal2014-008464
Application 13/208, 186
defined in Appellants' Specification. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14.
Claim 15
Claim 15 is an independent claim which recites, inter alia, "receiving
user input designating specific content desired by the user and accessing that
specific content from a server communicatively coupled to said client
system." Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding Ayloo teaches this
limitation. App. Br. 20; Reply Br. 15-16. In particular, Appellants argue
Ayloo is directed to providing advertising that a user has not requested and
has not designated by user input. App. Br. 20.
The Examiner does not respond to this argument in the Answer, and
the Final Action does not explain how this limitation is taught by Ayloo.
Final Act. 13 (citing Ayloo iJ 20). It is unclear from the record how the
teachings and disclosures of the prior art references are being applied by the
Examiner to reject claim 15. Moreover, we agree with Appellants that the
Examiner has not identified teachings in Ayloo that demonstrate "receiving
user input designating specific content desired by the user and accessing that
specific content from a server communicatively coupled to said client
system." Accordingly, we cannot sustain the rejection of claim 15.
Claims 2, 19, and 20
Claim 2 recites, "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein said proxy server
caching application running on said client system identifies said client
system as a proxy server to said server." Claims 19 and 20 contain similar
limitations. The Examiner finds Gulkis teaches this limitation by disclosing
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Application 13/208, 186
the client executing a proxy application that corresponds to an application
executing on a server. Final Act. 7 (citing Gulkis ii 6).
Appellants argue Gulkis is silent as to the client system running the
proxy application identifying itself as a proxy server. App. Br. 13. The
Examiner does not respond to this argument in the Answer, and the Final
Action does not sufficiently explain how this limitation is taught by Gulkis.
See Final Act. 7 (citing Gulkis ii 6). It is unclear from the record how the
teachings and disclosures of the prior art references are being applied by the
Examiner to reject claim 2. Moreover, we agree with Appellants that the
Examiner has not identified teachings in Gulkis that demonstrate "said proxy
server caching application running on said client system identifies said client
system as a proxy server to said server." Accordingly, we cannot sustain the
rejection of claims 2, 19, and 20.
CONCLUSIONS
On the record before us and in view of the analysis above, we are not
persuaded by Appellants' contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Appellants argue
the patentability of claim 8 for the same reasons. See App. Br. 12-13.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 8. We also sustain the rejections
of claims 3, 9, 16, and 18, which were not argued separately. See App. Br.
9-17.
On the record before us and in view of the analysis above, we are not
persuaded by Appellants' contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 4. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 4. We also sustain the
rejections of claims 5-7 and 10-13, which were not argued separately. See
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Application 13/208, 186
App. Br. 9-19.
On the record before us and in view of the analysis above, we are not
persuaded by Appellants' contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 14. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 14. We also sustain
the rejection of claims 17, which was not argued separately and is
commensurate in scope with claim 17. See App. Br. 9-19.
On the record before us and in view of the analysis above, Appellants'
argument has persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15.
Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 15.
On the record before us and in view of the analysis above, Appellants'
argument has persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2, 19,
and 20. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 2, 19, and 20.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 3-14, and
16-18.
We reverse the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 2, 15, 19,
and 20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § l .136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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