No. 92-1446. December 11, 1995. Harold C. Wegner, Foley Lardner, of Washington, D.C., argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Herbert I. Cantor and Douglas P. Mueller. Of counsel was Don J. Pelto. Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, Lee E. Barrett, Associate Solicitor, John W. Dewhirst, Associate Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor and Richard E. Schafer, Associate Solicitor
Patent Appeal No. 7218. April 15, 1965. A.M. Prentiss, West Hartford, Conn., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Chief Judge WORLEY, pursuant to provisions of Section 294(d), Title 28, United States
Patent Appeal No. 6857. January 16, 1963. John F. Smith, and Donald J. Rich, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Com'r. of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. ALMOND, Judge. Appellant appeals from an adverse decision of the Board of Appeals which affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 8 and 9 of his application for a patent on a chemical feeder. No claims were
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)