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Ex Parte Paidimarri et al

13406849 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2016)
Ex Parte Paidimarri et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC

    669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 1,070 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “flexible” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and reversing the construction of “capable of being noticeably flexed with ease”

  2. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  3. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc.

    782 F.3d 671 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the applicant's use of the phrase 'refers to' "indicate[d] an intention to define a term" that precluded a different definition during claim construction

  4. Application of Prater

    415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 78 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination "since the applicant may then amend his claims"

  5. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear

  6. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  7. In re Self

    671 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Appeal No. 81-542. February 18, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 22, 1982. Roland T. Bryan, Stamford, Conn., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  8. Application of Priest

    582 F.2d 33 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    Appeal No. 78-511. August 17, 1978. Eugene C. Trautlein, New York City, for appellant; James C. Arvantes, Union Carbide Corp., Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board

  9. Glass v. Betsey

    3 U.S. 6 (1794)   Cited 3 times

    FEBRUARY TERM, 1794. For the Appellants, the case was briefly opened, upon the following principles. The question is of great importance; and extends to the whole judicial authority of the United States; for, if the admiralty has no jurisdiction, there can be no jurisdiction in any common law court. Nor is it material to distinguish the ownership of the vessel and cargo; since strangers, or aliens, in amity, are entitled equally with Americans to have their property protected by the laws. Vatt. B

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)

  11. Section 41.41 - Reply brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.41   Cited 8 times   25 Legal Analyses

    (a)Timing. Appellant may file only a single reply brief to an examiner's answer within the later of two months from the date of either the examiner's answer, or a decision refusing to grant a petition under § 1.181 of this title to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. (b)Content. (1) A reply brief shall not include any new or non-admitted amendment, or any new or non-admitted affidavit or other Evidence. See § 1.116 of this title for amendments, affidavits or other evidence

  12. Section 41.52 - Rehearing

    37 C.F.R. § 41.52   Cited 7 times   9 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by