Ex Parte Onoda et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology

    184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 538 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that district court correctly determined structure was "an algorithm executed by a computer," but "erred by failing to limit the claim to the algorithm disclosed in the specification"
  3. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 136 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"
  4. In re Rouffet

    149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 160 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness [secondary considerations] "includes copying, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, commercial success, unexpected results created by the claimed invention, unexpected properties of the claimed invention, licenses showing industry respect for the invention, and skepticism of skilled artisans before the invention"
  5. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid
  6. Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc.

    725 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 53 times
    Affirming district court's striking in part of an expert declaration that included untimely disclosures
  7. In re Cree, Inc.

    818 F.3d 694 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 25 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "self-serving statements from researchers about their own work do not have the same reliability"
  8. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)