Ex Parte Neubourg

15 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,557 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.

    195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 142 times
    Proceeding to determine whether differences between the two claims are patentably distinct after construing the claims
  3. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 84 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"
  4. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 92 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted
  5. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 96 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure
  6. In re Antor Media Corp.

    689 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 32 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1465. Reexamination Nos. 90/007,839 90/007,936 90/007,942 90/007,957 90/009,261. 2012-07-27 In re ANTOR MEDIA CORPORATION. Thomas A. Lewry, Brooks Kushman, P.C., of Southfield, Michigan, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Cunningham. William Lamarca, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitor. LOURIE

  7. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"
  8. Greenliant Systems, Inc. v. Xicor LLC

    692 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding surrender where "[d]uring prosecution . . . , [the applicant] both amended claim 13 to add the . . . limit and relied on the . . . limit . . . to overcome prior art"
  9. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2
  10. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims
  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,143 times   481 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)