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Ex parte NATTA et al.

07883912 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 29, 1998)
Ex parte NATTA et al.

10 Cited authorities

  1. Application of Sarett

    327 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964)   Cited 32 times
    Reversing rejections for obviousness-type double patenting because generic and specific claims may nonetheless be patently distinct

  2. In re Anderson

    471 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 19 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8837. January 26, 1973. S. Augustus Demma, New York City, attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the Patent Office Board of Appeals decision affirming the rejection of claims 1-10, all claims of application serial No. 642,294, filed May

  3. Application of Dinh-Nguyen

    492 F.2d 856 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 12 times

    Patent Appeal No. 9134. February 28, 1974. Anthony M. Lorusso, Kenway, Jenney Hildreth, Boston, Mass., attorney of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Henry W. Tarring, II, Falls Church, Va., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming the rejection under 35 U.S.C

  4. Anderson v. Natta

    480 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 9 times
    In Anderson, the court assumed that Baxter had successfully tested the film to demonstrate that it was tough, self-supporting, flexible, and had a characteristic infrared spectrum, but nevertheless concluded that this "utility" was not of a practical quality within section 101. The issue in the instant case is whether Ziegler's lesser assertions of "utility" are of a practical quality.

  5. Application of Kamal

    398 F.2d 867 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7964. July 3, 1968. Anthony A. Juettner, Gene O. Enockson, William C. Babcock, Minneapolis, Minn., George R. Jones, David S. Abrams, Bowie, Md., Beale Jones, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and Judges RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. ARTHUR M. SMITH

  6. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 120 - Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States

    35 U.S.C. § 120   Cited 600 times   109 Legal Analyses
    Granting an earlier priority date to later applications for inventions that were disclosed in a previous application

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)