Ex Parte Narasimha et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 26, 2018

14608286 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/608,286 01129/2015
73635 7590 06/28/2018
The Watson Intellectual Property Group, PLC
[Motorola]
3133 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Hudsonville, MI 49426
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Murali Narasimha
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
MMOl 160-US-NP 3534
EXAMINER
PHUONG, DAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2644
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/28/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
lchapa@watson-ip.com
mloppnow@watson-ip.com
docketing.mobility@motorola.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MURALI NARASIMHA, ERIC BERDINIS,
STEVES. KIM, and ROBERT T. LOVE 1
Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
Technology Center 2600
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1--4, 6, 8, 11-12, and 14--24. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b ).
We reverse.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Motorola Mobility LLC
(App. Br. 3).
2 The Examiner objected to claims 5, 7, 9, 10, and 13 as being dependent
upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in
independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any
intervening claims (Final Act. 17).
Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention is directed to "operating a user client wireless
communication device on a wireless wide area communication network
without using a user wireless wide area communication device as a server"
(Spec. if 2).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject
matter on appeal.
1. A method in a user client wireless communication
device, the method comprising:
establishing at the user client wireless communication
device, a communication link with a user wireless wide area
network communication device;
requesting at least one temporary wireless wide area
network communication security key for a wireless wide area
network from the user wireless wide area network
communication device;
receiving the at least one temporary wireless wide area
network communication security key from the user wireless
wide area network communication device, where the at least
one temporary wireless wide area network communication
security key is a key generated by the user wireless wide area
network communication device;
receiving, from the user wireless wide area network
communication device, at least one count of a number of non
access stratum messages transmitted by the user wireless wide
area network communication device; and
operating the user client wireless communication device
on the wireless wide area network independent from the user
wireless wide area network communication device by using the
at least one temporary wireless wide area network
communication security key from the user wireless wide area
network communication device.
(App. Br. 33 (Claims App'x).)
2
Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
REJECTIONS AND REFERENCES
Claims 1-3, 8, 12, 14--16, 18-21, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 based upon the teachings ofMorikuni (US 8,195,233 B2, June
5, 2012), Rajadurai (US 2012/0129500 Al, May 24, 2012), and Escott (US
2014/0112474 Al, Apr. 24, 2014). 3
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon the teachings of
Morikuni, Rajadurai, Escott, and Khalil (US 2015/0105068 Al, Apr. 16,
2015).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon the teachings of
Morikuni, Rajadurai, Escott, and Lee (US 2014/0010180 Al, Jan. 9, 2014).
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon the teachings
ofMorikuni, Rajadurai, Escott, and Bassu (US 2012/0036360 Al, Feb. 9,
2012).
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon the teachings
ofMorikuni, Rajadurai, Escott, and Zhu (US 2012/0155375 Al, June 21,
2012).
3 Claim 17 was not specifically included in the rejection on page 3 of the
Final Action or in the Answer. The Examiner appears to not to discuss how
the cited prior art renders claim 17 obvious. Claim 17, however, recites
limitations commensurate with the limitations of claim 4, and the Examiner
provides specific findings and reasons for the rejection of claim 4 (see Final
Act. 13-14). In view of this, we consider claim 17 to stand rejected on the
same basis as claim 4. We also note Appellants do not argue Examiner error
for the rejection ofclaim 17, thus waiving any such argument (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv)).
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Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
ANALYSIS
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Escott discloses
"receiving, from the user wireless wide area network communication device,
at least one count of a number of non access stratum messages transmitted
by the user wireless wide area network communication device," as recited in
independent claims 1, 15, 18, and 23 (see, e.g., App. Br. 9--10, 15-16, 21-
22, 27-28). Appellants argue "[T]here is no section [in Escott] that
discloses a user device sending or receiving a NAS message to or from
another user device" (App. Br. 10). Additionally, Appellants argue Escott
does not teach or suggest "receiving at least one count of a number ofNAS
messages from a user wide area network communication device" as Escott
only receives and sends NAS messages, not a count of a number ofNAS
messages (App. Br. 10-11).
Initially we note Escott is directed to facilitating "secure device to
device (D2D) communications in a Long Term Evolution (LTE) based
wireless wide area network (WWAN)" (Escott i-f 2), as is Appellants'
claimed invention. Appellants' Specification indicates the user wireless
wide area network (WW AN) communication device is the user device 110
and the user client wireless communication device is the client device 120,
shown in Figure 1 (Spec. i-f 28, Fig. 1; i-f 35, Fig. 2).
Appellants' Figure 1 is reproduced below with additional markings
for illustration.
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Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
160
~ ___________ ./ '•-........................................................ __ ~\
{ '-._f/ \
.......... L ......... L ........
Appellants' Figure 1 shows communication system 100 including user
device (110) in communication with client device (120).
The argued claim limitation requires the user client wireless
communication device (i.e., client device 120), shown in Figure 1, to receive
at least one count of a number ofNAS messages from the user wireless wide
area network communication device (i.e., user device 110).
The Examiner finds paragraphs 100, 112, and 118 of Escott teach and
suggest one communication device receives a NAS message from another
communication device, as claimed (Ans. 6; see also Figs. 7, 11, 14, 15;
Escott ,-r 92 ("The method may be performed by a UE") ). The Examiner
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Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
finds the term "user wireless wide area network communication device" is
not "an end user wireless wide area network communication device" and, as
such, can be broadly and reasonably interpreted to encompass any "network
device" or "wireless area network communication device" including Escott's
"Mobility Management Entity" (MME) described in paragraphs 112 and 118
in connection with Figures 14--15 (Ans. 6-8). "For that reason, the
Examiner equates the user wireless wide area network communication
device as the wireless wide area network communication device/Mobility
Management Entity" (Ans. 8).
In the Reply, Appellants further argue Escott's "Mobility
Management Entity (MME)" is not and cannot be the same as Appellants'
claimed "user wireless wide area network communication device" because
(1) Escott describes the MME as separate from user device (UE) 120, shown
in Figure 1 (see also Escott's Figures 8-9), and (2) Appellants' Specification
also describes the "Mobility Management Entity (MME)" as separate from
user devices 110-120, shown in Figure 1 (Reply Br. 3--4).
We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments. At the outset, we note
claim terms are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004). However, "the construction cannot be divorced from the
specification and the record evidence." In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279,
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "[T]he proper BRI construction is not just the
broadest construction, but rather the broadest reasonable construction in
light of the specification." In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, No.
2015-1562, 2016 WL 1567181, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Microsoft
Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)) ("A
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Appeal 2017-011270
Application 14/608,286
construction that is 'unreasonably broad' and which does not 'reasonably
reflect the plain language and disclosure' will not pass muster.").
Paragraph 112 of Escott describes the use of an MME as part of an
L TE network architecture, also known as an Evolved Packet System (EPS),
shown in Figure 1, and as separate and distinct from user devices (UE 1 and
UE2) to support wireless communication between these user devices (UE 1
and UE2), including any transmission or reception ofNAS messages (Escott
i-f 112). Likewise, paragraph 118 of Escott describes an MME in the context
of an apparatus configured to receive a NAS message from the second UE,
including a count value for the NAS message associated with the second UE
(Escott i-f 118). Similar to Escott, Appellants' Specification also describes
the MME as separate and distinct from the user devices 110-120 as shown
in Figure 1 (Spec. i-f 28).
When viewed in light of Appellants' Specification, we agree with
Appellants the term "user wireless wide area network communication
device" cannot be broadly and reasonably interpreted to encompass Escott's
MME. As such, we agree with Appellants that Escott does not teach or
suggest the disputed limitation "receiving, from the user wireless wide area
network communication device, at least one count of a number of non access
stratum messages transmitted by the user wireless wide area network
communication device," as recited in independent claims 1, 15, 18, and 23.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claim 1, and independent claims 15, 18, and 23, argued for
substantially the same reasons. We also do not sustain the rejection of
dependent claims 2--4, 6, 8, 11-12, 14, 16, 17, 19-22, and 24.
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Application 14/608,286
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1--4, 6, 8, 11-12, and 14--24
is reversed.
REVERSED
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