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Ex Parte Moore et al

12997391 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2019)
Ex Parte Moore et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  3. In re Baxter

    656 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 19 times
    Explaining that "comprising" is a term of art meaning that the named elements are essential, but that other elements may be added and still form a construct

  4. In re Boe

    355 F.2d 961 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive

  5. Application of Mills

    470 F.2d 649 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8796. December 29, 1972. Marion C. Staves, Wilmington, Del., attorney of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C. Robert D. Edmonds, Oakton, Va., of Counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals sustaining the examiners's rejection of claims 1-4

  6. Application of Ayers

    154 F.2d 182 (C.C.P.A. 1946)   Cited 10 times

    Patent Appeal No. 5107. March 6, 1946. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 278,027. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Joseph W. Ayers for a patent on a process of producing iron oxide. From a decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the primary examiner's final rejection of one of the claims, applicant appeals. Affirmed. Hammond Littell, of New York City (Albert C. Johnston, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. W.W. Cochran, of Washington

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)