Ex Parte Mima et al

9 Cited authorities

  1. In re Mayne

    104 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 38 times
    Finding a claimed enterokinase recognition sequence containing the amino acid sequence Phe–Pro–Leu was merely “an obvious functional equivalent” to prior art sequences that included arrangements of Phe–Pro–Ile and Leu–Pro–Leu
  2. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  3. Application of Freeman

    474 F.2d 1318 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 13 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8798. March 8, 1973. Richard P. Mueller, William J. Schramm, Niagara Falls, N.Y., attorneys of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals sustaining the examiner's rejection of all

  4. Application of D'Ancicco

    439 F.2d 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8460. April 8, 1971. Rehearing Denied June 3, 1971. George T. Johannesen, Kalamazoo, Mich., attorney of record, for appellant; John Kekich, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FORD, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  5. Application of Klosak

    455 F.2d 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8582. March 9, 1972. Charles W. B. Connors, Chicago, Ill. (Johnston, Root, O'Keeffe, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., son Shurtleff), Chicago, Ill., attorneys E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,143 times   481 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  7. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  8. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  9. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)