Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting
Bankruptcy Nos. B79-2876, B79-2977. Adversary No. 79-0002A. January 17, 1980. Mitchell, Clarke, Pate, Anderson Wimberly, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff. Herbert Broadfoot, II, and David Pollard, Swift, Currie, McGhee Hiers, Atlanta, Ga., for Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc. and Robmac, Inc. James C. Bussart and Sherman C. Fraser, Atlanta, Ga., for L. M. Adamson. Stacey W. Cotton, Atlanta, Ga., for R. Arnold Baker. Donald E. O'Brien, Atlanta, Ga., for Robert J. Butt and William C. Ellis. ORDER
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES.- (1) APPOINTMENT.-The United States Patent and Trademark Office shall have a Patent Public Advisory Committee and a Trademark Public Advisory Committee, each of which shall have nine voting members who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce and serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Commerce. In each year, 3 members shall be appointed to each Advisory Committee for 3-year terms that shall begin on December 1 of that year. Any vacancy on
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)