Appeal No. 80-604. June 18, 1981. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., Thomas E. Lynch, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Frederick A. Zoda, Trenton, N.J., atty., for appellants. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board") which affirmed the examiner's rejections of claims
Appeal No. 81-563. January 15, 1982. J. Philip Polster, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MILLER, Judge. The decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board") sustaining the rejection of claims 36-48 as unsupported by an adequate disclosure required
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section. 37 C.F.R. §1.132 65 FR 57057 , Sept. 20, 2000 Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 7 is placed in the
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)