Ex Parte Market et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. Diamond v. Diehr

    450 U.S. 175 (1981)   Cited 537 times   130 Legal Analyses
    Holding a procedure for molding rubber that included a computer program is within patentable subject matter
  2. Gottschalk v. Benson

    409 U.S. 63 (1972)   Cited 502 times   59 Legal Analyses
    Holding claim involving mathematical formula invalid under § 101 that did not preempt a mathematical formula
  3. In re Bilski

    545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 270 times   40 Legal Analyses
    Holding that non-preemption under the second step of what was then called the "Freeman –Walter –Abele test" requires that the claim be "tied to a particular machine or bring about a particular transformation of a particular article"
  4. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc. v. Garlock

    721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 326 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court erred by "considering the references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand"
  5. In re Nuijten

    500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 62 times   13 Legal Analyses
    Declining to import a tangible medium element into the claims directed to only encoded signals, which were unpatentable under § 101
  6. Nissim Corp. v. Time Warner, Inc.

    555 U.S. 1218 (2009)   Cited 5 times

    No. 08–954. 2009-03-2 NISSIM CORP., petitioner, v. TIME WARNER, INC., et al. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied. THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

  7. In re Alappat

    33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 82 times   17 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims directed to a specially-programmed computer—a “specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result”—are directed to patent eligible subject matter
  8. In re Ferguson

    558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 27 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Reaffirming that the "useful, concrete, and tangible" result test has no continuing validity
  9. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.

    730 F.2d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that dependent claim "cannot be anticipated" where the independent claim "is not anticipated"
  10. Application of Johnson

    589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 16 times

    Appeal Nos. 76-717 to 76-719. December 7, 1978. Rehearing Denied February 15, 1979. William J. Beard, attorney of record, Houston, Tex., for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. These appeals are from the decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board

  11. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  12. Section 101 - Inventions patentable

    35 U.S.C. § 101   Cited 3,493 times   2273 Legal Analyses
    Defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)