No. 90-1362. May 13, 1991. Thomas W. Tolpin, Highland Park, Ill., argued for appellant. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey B. Gorman and Marilyn Katz (hereinafter "Gorman") appeal the decision of the United States
Appeal No. 79-586. May 15, 1980. James J. Farrell, New York City, attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, and Trademarks; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and NEWMAN, Judge. The Honorable Bernard Newman, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. NEWMAN, Judge. This is an
Patent Appeal No. 8923. June 14, 1973. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals, Serial No. 679,670. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION MARKEY, Chief Judge. The Commissioner has petitioned for rehearing and reconsideration with respect to our reversal of the § 112 rejection based on the first paragraph description requirement. Our view that original claim 2 in itself constituted sufficient "description in the original disclosure" of a subgenus within the broad class of quanidinoalkyl-1:
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)